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The Output-Welfare Fallacy:
A Modern Antitrust Paradox
John M. Newman*
ABSTRACT: A fallacy lies at the core of modern antitrust. The same scholars
who successfully advanced a singularconsumer-welfare goal simultaneously
argued that output effects should be the exclusive criterionfor analysis. This
output-welfare framework entered mainstream discourse, was endorsed by
enforcers and judges, and played a pivotal role in the Supreme Court's recent
Ohio v. American Express opinion. Yet despite its centrality, outputism
has largely escaped notice.
When exposed to systematic evaluation, the previously assumed link between
output and welfare breaks down. A wide variety of conduct can push output
and welfare in opposite directions. Moreover, purely outputist analysis is
often unworkable in markets-for labor, social networking online search,
and more-thatare ofparticularinterest to contemporary antitrust.
Recognizing the Output-Welfare Fallacy offers substantial payoffs. It
illuminates and undercuts a fundamental illogic that motivates outputist
judicialdecisions, which warrantswift reversal. Marketpower can be defined
as the power to control competition, rather than power to profitably reduce
output. Plaintiffs need not demonstrate an output reduction to carry their
initial burden of proof Conversely, defendants need not prove that output
increasedin orderto make out a validprocompetitivejustification.In general,
moving beyond the narrow confines of output-based analysis enables the
application of a more coherent, practical, and efficient antitrustframework.
I.

INTRODUCTION: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF ................

564

Associate Professor, University of Miami School of Law. This Article benefited greatly
*
from feedback offered by participants at conferences hosted by the University of Pennsylvania
School of Law, Yale Law School, and the Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro; and from
suggestions offered by Rebecca Allensworth, Gregory Day, Andrew Elmore, Warren Grimes, Herb
Hovenkamp,Jack Kirkwood, Chris Sagers, Steve Salop, Spencer Weber Waller, and Sam Weinstein.
Camila Chediak, Hayden Cherry, and Andrew Graykowski provided outstanding research assistance.
This article was written in my personal capacity, as Professor, prior to working at the Federal
Trade Commission ("FTC"). The views expressed are my own and not necessarily those of the
Commission or any individual Commissioner.

563

IOWA LAW REVIEW

564
II.

THE OUTPUT-WELFARE FALLACY.................................................

A.

III.

(VOl.

107:563

569

H ISTORICAL ORIGINS ............................................................. 569

B.

APPLICATION TO ANTITRUST: THE RISE OF CHICAGO......... 571

C.

ENTERING THE MAiNSTREAM................................................... 577

DECOUPLING OUTPUT AND WELFARE..........................................581
A.

DIVERGENT OUTPUTAND WELFARE EFECTS...................582

1. Creating, Exploiting, or Alleviating
Information Asymmetries..........--------.....................-----582
---................ 585
2. Externalizing Costs............... - -

3. C oercion ...................................................................

588

4.

Intrabrand Vertical Restraints......................589

6.

First-Degree Price Discrimination................................593

5. Price Predation, With or Without Recoupment .-------- 591

7. Cognitive Exploitation --------------------.......................------8.
B.

595

Customer and Consumer Coordination------------..........597

SIMULTANEOUS AND CONFLICTING OUTPUTAND
WELFARE EFFECTs.......................................

598

"Push/Pull" Effects: Conduct Affecting Multiple
Products ........................................................................- 599
2. Application: Online Search, Social Media,
and M ore.................................................................... 6o 1
1.

C.

HARM ABSENT OUTPUTEFFECTS ............................................. 603

1.
2.

IV.

Price Discrimination with Marginal Customers..........603
Inelastic Demand/Supply Below/Above
a Walkaway Price ........................................................... 6o6

ESCAPING THE NEW ANTITRUST PARADOX ................................... 607
A.

BURYING AMEX: BAD LA W, WORSE ECONOMICS.......................6o8

B.

REVISING BURDENS OFPROOF.................................................. 612

1. Market Power as Control..............................................612
2. Plaintiffs Need Not Prove That Output
Decreased ....................................................................... 6 14
3. Defendants Need Not Prove an Output
Increase...................................................................... 6 16
V.

CONCLUSION ................................................................................

I.

618

INTRODUCTION: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF

At the core of the U.S. antitrust tradition lies a fallacy: that "output" is
interchangeable with "consumer welfare." Under this view, consumer welfare
is the exclusive goal of antitrust-but output effects are to be the exclusive
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means of actual analysis.' Plaintiffs cannot carry their initial burden of proof
unless they can demonstrate that the challenged conduct has reduced
output. 2 Defendants must prove that their conduct actually increased output
in order to make out a valid procompetitive justification.3
6
Leading treatises,4 law-school casebooks,s amicus briefs, and oft-cited
journal articles7 all conclude that antitrust can be boiled down to output
effects. 8 Scattered judicial references to this output-centric conception can be
located as early as the late 1970s. And, at long last, outputism reached its apex
in the U.S. Supreme Court's 2018 Ohio v. American Express Co. ("AmEx")
decision.9 In AmEx, a 5-4 majority announced that the government needed
to demonstrate an output reduction, despite abundant evidence that the
challenged restraints had stifled innovation, increased the prices of nearly
every good and service sold at retail in the United States, and more.o
But this narrow vision of antitrust rests on a flawed foundation. Output
effects cannot serve as the sole criterion for evaluating welfare effects." The
resulting body of antitrust doctrine and discourse is internally inconsistent,

1.
Historically, antitrust law was thought to promote multiple policy objectives. But beginning
in the 1950s, Chicago School scholars successfully advanced the argument that promoting consumer
welfare should become the exclusive goal of the antitrust laws. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp,

Whatever Did Happen to the Antitrust Movement?, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 583, 598-601 (2018);
Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, The Goals of Antitrust: Welfare Trumps Choice, 81
FORDHAM L. REV. 2405, 2405-06 (2013); Eleanor M. Fox, Modernization of Antitrust: A New
Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1140, 1154, 1154 n.76 (1981).
ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 122 (2d ed.
2.
1993) ("The task of antitrust is to identify and prohibit those forms of behavior whose net effect
is output restricting and hence detrimental.").
3.
Id. ("If a practice does not raise a question of output restriction ... [, it] should be held
lawful.").
See, e.g., IX PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
4.
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION I 114a (4th ed. 2013) ("[T]he overall goal is
markets that maximize output.").
E. THOMAS SULLIVAN, HERBERT HOVENKAMP, HOWARD A. SHELANSKI & CHRISTOPHER R.
5.
LESLIE., ANTITRUST LAW, POLICY AND PROCEDURE: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 2 (7th ed. 2014)

("Absent a finding of output limitation, the conduct is deemed efficient and beyond the
condemnation of the antitrust laws.").
6. Brief for Antitrust L. & Econ. Scholars as Amicus Curiae Supporting of Respondents at
3, Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018) (No. 16-1454) ("The fundamental goal of
antitrust law is to foster consumer welfare by enhancing or increasing output. . . .").
Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 31 (1984) ("If
7.
arrangements are anticompetitive, the output and market share of those using them must fall.").
See infra Section II.C.
SeegenerallyOhio v. Am. Express Co., 1 3 8 S. Ct. 2274 (2o18) (holding "Amex's antisteering
9.
provisions [do not] violate federal antitrust law").
8.

10o.

Id. at

2288.

Throughout, this Article takes the "consumer welfare" goal as a given, without weighing
11.
in on whether it is descriptively accurate or normatively desirable-it is "[a]n internal critique
... one made from within the premises of the system under examination."John Henry Schlegel,
OfDuncan, Peter, and Thomas Kuhn, 22 CARDOzo L. REV. 1061, [o61 n.4 (2000).

566

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 107:563

sometimes to the point of incoherence. Outputism harms the very consumers
that modern antitrust law purports to protect. In short, this "Output-Welfare
Fallacy" has produced a new antitrust paradox-a policy at war with itself. i"
The Output-Welfare Fallacy did not arise from a vacuum. Part II of this
Article excavates its role as a key contributor to the Chicago Revolution in
antitrust. Oceans of ink have been spilled describing antitrust law's embrace
of the consumer-welfare standard.13 Contemporary critics contend that
antitrust became overly narrow under the influence of Chicago School
academics and judges. Among the leading charges is that the consumerwelfare framework focuses exclusively, or at least primarily, on prices.'4 This
critique has gained considerable traction, to the extent that it now manifests
throughout popular discourse in statements like the following: "For decades,
antitrust enforcers have centered the consumer welfare standard, which
defined price increases as the only valid focus of antitrust action.",5
This predominant existing narrative overlooks the crucial interplay
between output and welfare. In fact, hardline Chicagoans explicitly reject
analysis of price effects as a "deleterious" return to the bad old days. 6 From
the very beginning, advocacy of a unitary consumer-welfare goal has been
accompanied by insistence that output-not price-should be the exclusive
criterion for assessment.17 As Robert Bork put it, "[t]he task of antitrust is to

12.
BORK, supra note 2. The irony, of course, is that Robert Bork's book purporting to
eliminate an antitrust paradox became an ur-text responsible for creating one.

Barak Orbach, How Antitrust Lost Its Goal, 81 FORDHAM L. REv. 2253, 2272-75 (201 3).
See, e.g., TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE 88 (2018)
("Bork . .. meant that in any antitrust case, the government or plaintiff had to prove to a certainty
that the complained-of behavior actually raised prices for consumers."); Lina M. Khan, Note,
Amazon's Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 710 (2017) ("[T]he current framework in
antitrust-specifically its pegging competition to 'consumer welfare,' defined as short-term price
effects-is unequipped to capture the architecture of market power in the modern economy.").
Khan, Wu, and other critics are correct to point out that much of contemporary antitrust practice
has become heavily price-focused. The present contribution, however, clarifies that the
Chicagoan paradigm has always centered output, not prices, above all else; and, second, that in a
difficult (which is to say, important) case today, orthodox analysis is far more likely to focus
exclusively on output than it is to focus exclusively on price effects.
13.

14.

15. Joshua Brustein, DemocratsAre the Hipsters ofAntitrust, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 19, 2020, 9:28
[https://
AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2020-08-19/the-hipsters-of-antitrust
perma.cc/6SGU-2BBP]; see also, e.g., Luke Mullins, Big Tech Is About to Spend a Ton of Money to Fight
These People, WASHINGTONIAN (Sept. 15, 2019), https://www.washingtonian.com/20ig/og/
[https://perma.cc/E3UB-VKGY]
1 5 /big-tech-spend-money-to-fight-barry-lynn-open-markets
(discussing the current popular antitrust movement).
16. Charles (Rick) Rule, Antitrust Paradox Conference: Corporations, Securities, & Antitrust Practice
Group, Panel I: Generational Impact of The Antitrust, FEDERALIST SOC'Y, at 11:26 (June 22, 2018),
https://fedsoc.org/conferences/antitrust-paradox-conference#agenda-item-panel-i-generationalimpact-of-the-antitrust [https://perma.cc/ 5 GK8-MgWC].
17.
See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market
Division, 75 YALE L.J. 373, 375 (1966) [hereinafter Bork, Rule of Reason 11] ("Acceptance of
consumer want satisfaction as the law's ultimate value requires the courts to employ as their
primary criterion the impact of any agreement upon output. . . .").
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identify and prohibit those forms of behavior whose net effect is output
8
restricting and hence detrimental.", Conduct that increases output must be
welfare-enhancing, and therefore procompetitive.,9 The embrace of
consumer welfare cannot be understood apart from the ascendance of
outputist analysis-the two were both contemporaneous and endogenous.
As Part II goes on to explain, the output-only prong of this new
framework was quickly embraced by Reagan-era federal agency enforcers,20
endorsed by Chicagoan appointees to the federal judiciary,2, and today has
become ubiquitous.22 Output, not price, is the "Holy Grail" of the
contemporary antitrust orthodoxy.23
Such heavy reliance on output is misplaced. Drawing insights from
microeconomic theory and empirical research, Part III of this Article
catalogues a wide variety of scenarios in which output and welfare move in
conflicting directions.24 First, various types of marketplace activity can increase
output while decreasing welfare.25 The inverse is also true: various types of
conduct can decrease output while increasing welfare. Second, conduct can
simultaneously exert conflicting upward and downward pressure on output
and also conflicting upward and downward pressure on welfare.2 6 Third,
conduct can reduce welfare without affecting output in either direction.27
These are not limited or narrow exceptions to the norm. They involve
8
types of conduct that lie at the very core of antitrust doctrine and practice,
conditions that are common in the real world and figure prominently in

18.

BORK, supra note 2, at 122.

19.

Id.

See infra Section II.B (discussing positions espoused by William F. Baxter,James C. Miller
20.
III, Charles "Rick" Rule, and others).
See infra Section II.B (discussing positions espoused by Judges Posner, Bork, Ginsburg,
21.
and Easterbrook).
See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust's Borderline 3 (U. Pa. Inst. for L. & Econ. Rsch.,
22.
6 6
Paper No. 20-44, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract-id=3 5 702 [https://
perma.cc/DRgT-GGM] (identifying "reasons for preferring output rather than price as the primary
indicator of consumer welfare"); see also infra Section H.C (collecting sources).
See Daniel A. Crane, Harmful Output in the Antitrust Domain: Lessons from the Tobacco
23.
Industry, 39 GA. L. REV. 321, 339-41 (2005) (arguing that antitrust should not blindly seek to
increase output in "net-harm" industries like tobacco). Crane's article is one of the few works that
explicitly recognize and also depart from the outputist framework. It is relatively narrow in scope,
however-focusing solely on the issue of net-harm products-and thus concludes with
correspondingly narrow normative prescriptions.
This Article targets the underlying theoretical framework. For an earlier critique based
24.
on administrability concerns, see Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompelitive Exclusion:
RaisingRivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 2og, 283-84 (1986).
25.

See infra Section II.A.

26.

See infra Section nLB.

See infra Section II.C.
28. These include, inter alia, tying, predatory pricing, stifling innovation, deception, vertical
intrabrand restraints, and more. See infra Sections III.A. i, hLA. 3 - 5 , flIC.1.

27.
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antitrust law and economics,29 and markets-for online search, social media,
labor, payment networks, college education, and more-that are at the center
of ongoing antitrust policy debates and the forefront of enforcement efforts.30
The Output-Welfare Fallacy would require plaintiffs in each of these cases to
prove an output reduction. But, as Part III explains, conduct can cause harm
without reducing output-in fact, it can be extremely harmful while increasing
output.31 Moreover, the Output-Welfare Fallacy would foreclose defendants
from justifying any conduct that reduces output, regardless of whether that
conduct is actually beneficial. Thus, the Output-Welfare Fallacy threatens to
derail analysis in the most important antitrust cases of our time: United States
v. Google,32 FTC v. Facebook,3s NCAA v. Alston,34 and more.
Part IV offers a much-needed course correction. As an initial matter, the
Supreme Court's recent AmEx decision warrants immediate reversal, whether
by the Court itself or via the nascent legislative effort underway to do so.35
Scholars have already ably critiqued its approach to market definition and its
unusual formulation of the rule-of-reason framework.3 6 But identification of
the Output-Welfare Fallacy reveals a much deeper and less contestable-and
therefore more fatal-flaw in the majority's reasoning.37

29.
These include, inter alia, information asymmetries, negative externalities, and so-called
"behavioral" issues-aspects of cognition that are exploitable by firms. See infra Sections IILA.1,

III.A.2, III.A.7.
30.

See, e.g., Section III.B.1 (identifying the "Push/Pull" effects that can arise in barter markets).

31.

See infra Section III.A.

32.
Complaint, United States v. Google, No. 1:20-cv-o3oo (D.D.C. Oct. 20, 2020).
NetChoice, a Google-funded advocacy organization, has already floated an outputist defense:
"Has Google harmed consumers? No. Output is up significantly." SenateJudiciay One-Pager:Does
Google Pass the Antitrust Exam?, NETCHOICE, https://netchoice.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/

og/google-testimony-v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y 5 S8-JKDF].
33. Complaint, FTC v. Facebook, Inc., No. I:20-cv-03 5 9o-JEB (D.D.C.Jan. 13, 2021); see also
Complaint, New York v. Facebook, Inc., No. 1:20-cv-03 5 89-JEB (D.D.C. Dec. g, 2020) (a
companion lawsuit from 48 states claiming Facebook violated the Sherman Act).

34.

NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141 (2021) (petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court

granted).
U.S. HOUSE OF REP., SUBCOMMITrEE ON ANTITRUST, COMMERCIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE
35.
LAW OF THE COMMITTEE ON THEJUDICIARY, INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS

399

(z020),

https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/competition_in_digital_markets.pdf

[https://perma.cc/ 5 ZDM-NgXZ] (recommending "[o]verriding Ohio v. American Express").
36. See, e.g., John B. Kirkwood, Antitrust and Two-Sided Platforms: The Failure of American
Express, 41 CARDOZOL. REV. 1805, 1812-13, 1823-24 (2o2o); Erik Hovenkamp, Platform Antitrust,
44J. CORP. L. 713, 744-52 (2019).
See infra Section V.A. The decision bears singling out in part because the real-world
37.
harms resulting therefrom are especially massive. AmEx's conduct raises the costs of accepting
all credit cards, stifles innovation, forces the least well-off members of society to subsidize rewards
for the already-wealthy, and increases the price of nearly every good and service sold in the United
States. United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3 d 143, 207-23 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), rev'd on
other grounds, Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 1 3 8 S. Ct. 2274 (2018).

.
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Part IV next identifies the appropriate burdens of proof in antitrust
cases.38 The analytical lens cannot defensibly be narrowed to output alone.
This insight yields three doctrinal principles. First, plaintiffs need not
demonstrate that defendants have the ability to reduce output in order to
prove that defendants possess market power.39 Second, plaintiffs need not
prove an actual or likely output reduction in order to carry their initial burden
of proof. Third, defendants need not prove that their conduct increased
output in order to demonstrate a valid procompetitive justification.41 As to
each principle, Part IV offers case examples to illustrate the benefits of a more
robust, flexible approach. Avoiding the Output-Welfare Fallacy reflects better
economics and yields a simplified, more logical, more accurate, and less
harmful method for antitrust decision-making. Part V briefly concludes.
II.

THE OUTPUT-WELFARE FALLACY

The roots of antitrust outputism are embedded in neoclassical economic
theory. During the mid-Twentieth Century, a group of academics drew upon
neoclassical concepts to argue that allocative efficiency was of utmost
importance for antitrust policy.42 Under this view, the primary concern of
antitrust law is certainly not concentrated political power or the destruction
of small businesses-but neither is it higher prices.43 Instead, it is lost output,
and the concomitant misallocation of societal resources. This misallocation is
supposed to reduce welfare, making it undesirable from a utilitarian perspective.
That is a tale told simply enough. But understanding more fully the
nature of the Output-Welfare Fallacy in contemporary antitrust doctrine and
discourse requires a closer look at its origins. Outputism is deeply embedded
in antitrust's intellectual and institutional histories. As the following
discussion explains, it played a vital role in the embrace of the consumerwelfare standard.
A.

HISTORICAL ORIGINS

At least as far back as 1870, neoclassical economics emerged as an
identifiable strain of thought.44 The core of the theory was the assumption of

38.

See infra Section IV.B.

39.

See infra Section IV.B. i.
See infra Section IV.B.2.

40.
41.
42.

See infra Section IV.B. 3
See infra Section II.B (cataloguing the rise of outputism in and around the University of

Chicago).
See Herbert Hovenkamp & Fiona Scott Morton, Framing the Chicago School of Antitrust
i68 U. PA. L. REV. 1843, 1844-53 (2020).
See, e.g., Robert B. Ekelund Jr. & Robert F. Hebert, The Origins of Neoclassical
44.
Microeconomics, 16J. ECON. PERSPS. 197, 197-207 (2002) (labeling pre-1870 economists as "ProtoNeoclassicals").

43.

Analysis,

&
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marginalist decision-making.45 Manufacturers generally exert near-total
control over their own output decisions.4 6 Thus, suppliers were thought to
proceed by weighing the marginal costs of production against the expected
marginal revenues, and producing up until the point at which the former
would outweigh the latter.47 From the very beginning, then, neoclassicists
elevated output decisions to a place of central importance.
Neoclassical theory next married the notion of marginalism with the law
of demand, yielding a simple portrait of a "market."4 8 As to a given product,
when prices decrease, customers demand more (and vice versa). At the same
time, however, marginal production costs were assumed to increase across the
relevant range of production.49 Thus, each individual producer's output
decisions will (the model predicts) cause the market to reach an equilibrium
at which marginal revenue equals marginal cost.5 0
At last, neoclassical economists were ready to assess the relative
performance of "competition" and "monopoly." The difference was clear: The
monopoly equilibrium features lower output of the relevant product. Some
customers willing to pay the competitive price-and even some willing to pay
more than the competitive price-are unwilling to pay the monopoly price.51
Instead, these customers turn to their second-best option(s), thereby
diverting societal resources away from the "optimal" allocation. Thus,
monopoly negatively impacts allocative efficiency, the preferred normative
benchmark of neoclassical economics.52

45.

Herbert Hovenkamp, The MarginalistRevolution in Legal Thought, 46 VAND. L. REV. 305,

306 (1993).
See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Harm and Causation 14, 17 (U. Pa. Inst. for L.
46.
Econ. Rsch., Paper No. 21-10, 2021), https://papers.ssm.com/so3/papers.cfn?abstractid=3771399
[https://perma.cc/LS68-NgNK] ("Firms almost always have more control over output than they
do over price.").
47. Buyers are supposed to undertake a similar calculus, weighing the marginal benefits of
purchasing each additional unit against the marginal costs of doing so.
GEORGEJ. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 20 ( 4 th ed. 1987) ("[Consumers] invariably
48.
obey one law as universal as any in social life; they buy less of a thing when its price rises.").
49. This has remained a standard assumption. See, e.g., Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note
24, at 247 n. 117.
50. Because the model depicts a single market, rather than the broader economy, this is
denoted as a "partial" equilibrium.
Of course, some customers who were willing to pay more than the competitive price will
51.
pay the monopoly price. Monopoly thus shifts some surplus (and real wealth) from customers to
the monopolist. But this mere transfer is of no interest to most neoclassical economists, who
-following Bentham-were agnostic as to distributive effects. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 23 (rev. ed. 1999) ("The striking feature of the utilitarian view ofjustice is that it does not
matter, except indirectly, how this sum of satisfactions is distributed among individuals ... .").
52.
As Khan puts it, "[t]he Chicago School revolution in antitrust entailed a twofold shift,"
with both descriptive and normative elements. Lina M. Khan, The End ofAntitrust HistoryRevisited,
133 HARV. L. REv. 1655, 1665 (2020) (reviewing TIM Wu, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN
THENEwGILDEDAGE (2018)).
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Allocative efficiency was not preferred for its own sake. At the time the
underlying ideas were being developed, welfare economics-how best to
maximize society's utility, or well-being-was a central concern of the
discipline.53 Allocative efficiency was explicitly conceptualized as a means to
an end: the utilitarian maximization of welfare.54
B.

APPLICATION TO ANTITRUST: THE RISE OF CHICAGO

The attempt to wed neoclassical price theory and utilitarian welfarism
continued to suffer from substantial conceptual defects.55 But despite
ongoing debates within welfare economics, a handful of midcentury scholars
associated with the nascent law-and-economics movement became enamored
6
of the framework. In Marshallian cross diagrams,5 these lawyers saw a unified
field theory that could be applied to a variety of doctrinal areas-including,
most importantly, antitrust.57
Much of this intellectual activity was centered in and around the
University of Chicago.5 8 The early writings of Ward Bowman, for example,
contain the beginnings of an output-only vision for antitrust.59 In a 1953
article on monopoly, Bowman suggested that the "[1]ower outputs" in a
monopolized market result in a "diversion" of resources to other areas,
thereby "reduc[ing] ... the total income of the community .... "6o A year
later, Robert Bork authored a paper identifying the only objectionable feature

53.

157, 157

See, e.g., Anthony B. Atkinson, The Restoration of Welfare Economics, 1 o i AM. ECON. REV.

(2011).

Subsequent generations of economists spent far less time reflecting on how to
54.
conceptualize and measure welfare, though they continued to make normative claims about
"optimal," "efficient," and "welfare-enhancing" conduct and policy. Id. at 158-59. Sen attributes
this to avoidance of the theoretical difficulties. See Amartya Sen, The Possibility of Social Choice, 89

AM. ECON. REV. 349, 351-53 (1999).
See, e.g., Mark Glick, The Unsound Theory Behind the Consumer (and Total) Welfare Goal in
55.
Antitrust, 63 ANTITRUST BULL. 455, 457-63 (2018).
56. Though associated with Alfred Marshall, the earliest use of the diagram seems to have
been by Cournot, in 1838. See Thomas M. Humphrey, Marshallian Cross Diagramsand Their Uses

Before Alfred Marshall: The Origins of Supply and Demand Geometry, 78 EcoN. REV. 3, 3 (1992).
Robert Van Horn, Corporations and the Rise of the Chicago Law and Economics Movement,
57.
PROMARKET (Jan. 15, 2020), https://promarket.org/corporations-and-the-rise-of-the-chicagolaw-and-economics-movement [https://perma.cc/ 4 QSX-QUPL] ("Under the heading 'Policies
for Movement Towards the Free Market,' [Aaron] Director included ten policy areas and listed
antitrust policy first.").
58. There, key figures in the law school launched a "Free Market Study" intended to
destabilize the antitrust status quo. See id. Henry Simons referred to the Study as the "Hayek

Project." Id.
59. At the time, Bowman was a research associate at the law school, and Robert Bork was a
student. Bork described his first encounter with Bowman-in which Bowman presented a
neoclassical attack on unions to Bork's labor-law class-as formative. See Robert H. Bork, Ward S.

Bowman, Jr., 8 7 YALE L.J. 235, 236 (1977).
6o. Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Toward Less Monopoly, 1 o 1 U. PA. L. REV. 577, 623 (1953).

.
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of monopoly as allocative inefficiency due to "a restriction of output."6, Bowman's
influential 1957 article on tying similarly emphasized output effects. 62
By the 196os, this project had begun to coalesce. Output was treated as
if it were interchangeable with (allocative) efficiency, which began to be
treated as if it were interchangeable with "total wealth." 63 Conduct that
restricts output was therefore "antisocial." 64 And antitrust law was justified
only to the extent that it prohibited such conduct. 65 Contemporary deviations
from this preferred means-end framework created a perceived "crisis." 66
The ideological and material stakes were immense. As Bork and Bowman
recognized, antitrust was much more than "merely a set of economic
prescriptions applicable to a sector of the economy. ... [I] t is also an
expression of a social philosophy, an educative force, and a political symbol
of extraordinary potency." 6 7 Recognizing this, they cast about for a sufficiently
powerful label for their new goal. They had started with "income," 68 then
shifted to "wealth." In a foundational pair of articles, however, Bork began to
use "welfare" interchangeably with "wealth." 69 At the same time, he
rhetorically tied all of these various concepts-output, efficiency, and
welfare-to a discrete and sympathetic group: consumers.7 0 Output served as
a linchpin connecting allocative efficiency and consumer welfare, and
allowing the freedom to pivot between the two as desired.
By the mid-1g6os, all of the necessary pieces of the output-welfare
means-ends framework were in place. Bork's most influential articles clearly
espouse this vision. His explication merits quoting at length:

61. Robert Bork, Vertical Integration and the Sherman Act: The Legal History of an Economic
Misconception, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 157, 197-200 (1954).
62.
Although "[m]onopoly is commonly described as the power to set a price," Bowman
observed, the competitive effects of tying arrangements hinge on "supply restriction on the tied
product ... ." Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19,
20 n.5 (1957).
63.
See Robert H. Bork & Ward S. Bowman,Jr., The Goals of Antitrust: A Dialogueon Policy, 65
COLUM. L. REv. 363, 365 (1965). The citation herein is to a version of Bork and Bowman's "The
Crisis in Antitrust", originally published in the December 1963 issue of Fortunemagazine. Per the
law-review editors' footnote, this version was "expanded, revised, and documented." Id. at 363
n.
64.

Id.

65.
66.

See id.
Id. at 36 4

67.

Id.

68.

Bowman, supranote 6o, at 624.
69.
See Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market
Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775, 828 (1965) [hereinafter Bork, Rule of Reason I] ("consumer welfare");
id. at 831 ("the wealth of the society"); Bork, Rule of Reason II, supranote 17, at 375 ("[T] he law's
exclusive concern is with the maximization of wealth or consumer want satisfaction.").
70. Bork, Rule of Reason II, supra note 17, at 376-77 ("This ... article attempts to provide a
general theory capable of making the law . .. internally consistent, . .. and effective in serving
consumer welfare.").

THE OUTPUT-WELFARE FALLACY

20222]

573

Acceptance of consumer want satisfaction as the law's ultimate value
requires the courts to employ as their primary criterion the impact
of any agreement upon output, and thus to determine whether the
net effect of the agreement is to create efficiency, and thereby
increase output or, alternatively, to restrict output.7'
The passage succinctly contains the key elements of the Chicagoan position
regarding both antitrust's goals and the appropriate metric for analysis. The
exclusive goal of antitrust law is to promote consumer welfare.72 Welfare itself
may not be measurable, but lower output (always) represents lost efficiency
and therefore less welfare. Higher output (always) represents increased
efficiency and therefore more welfare. Thus, the proper way to conduct
antitrust analysis is to focus exclusively on output.73 Consumer welfare was to
be the end; output was to be the means.74
In the years that followed, Chicagoan academics expanded on and
reiterated these interrelated claims.75 Bork (in)famously purported to locate
in the Sherman Act's legislative history a singular goal, protecting consumer
welfare.7 6 Moreover, he suggested, "Sherman and his colleagues identified the
phrase 'restraint of commerce' or 'restraint of trade' with 'restriction of
output.'"77 In the first edition of Antitrust Law, Richard Posner explained that
71.

Id. at 375.

72.

Bork famously either intentionally or mistakenly conflated "consumer" and "total"

welfare. See e.g., Steven C. Salop, Question: What Is the Real and Proper Antitrust Welfare Standard?
Answer: The True Consumer Welfare Standard,22 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 336, 336 (2010) (referring
to the "confusion that has resulted from Judge Robert Bork's usage of the term 'consumer
welfare' in referring to aggregate welfare").
See, e.g., Bork, Rule of Reason I, supra note 69, at 838 ("The main tradition's policy of
73.
wealth maximization requires no balancing in a cartel case because the effect of the agreement
is only to restrict output. But the Brandeis tradition requires comparison of benefits to producers
and benefits to consumers.").
74. Allocative efficiency and a substantive preference for consumer interests are distinct
concepts. Sanjukta Paul, Antitrust as Allocatorof CoordinationRights, 67 UCLA L. REV. 378, 417-19
(2020). Bork did not appear to recognize the divergence-the two can be directly at odds-or if
he did, he did not meaningfully address it. The result was, variously, "ambiguity or equivocation."
Id. at 419. Paul contends that (1) consumer welfare "provide[d] an intuitive and supposedly
administrable decision rule for actual cases," while (2) allocative efficiency enabled Chicagoans
to benefit from the intellectual prestige of neoclassical economics. Id. The present analysis
suggests instead that output-which supposedly measures both efficiency and welfare-provided
the decision rule for actual cases, while consumer welfare provided the normatively appealing
goal. At the same time, output allowed Chicagoans to pivot between consumer welfare and
allocative efficiency, i.e., to have their cake and eat it too.
Bork added an argument from legislative history, though it did not stand up particularly
75.
well to subsequent scrutiny. Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9J.L.
& ECON. 7, 7 (1966) ("[T]he policy the courts were intended to apply is the maximization of
wealth or consumer want satisfaction. This requires courts to distinguish between agreements or
activities that increase wealth through efficiency and those that decrease it through restriction of
output.").

76.

Id.

77.

Id. at 16.
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"the cost of monopoly [is] the output which the monopolist does not produce,
and which a competitive industry would."7 8 The following year, in The Antitrust
Paradox, Bork flatly declared that "[t]he task of antitrust is to identify and
prohibit those forms of behavior whose net effect is output restricting and
hence detrimental."79
These advocates found a receptive audience in the post-Warren Era
Supreme Court.80 Judicial suggestions that output is the sine qua non of
antitrust appear as early as the Court's 1979 Broadcast Music Inc. ("BMI")
decision. Justice White, speaking for the majority, opined that "our inquiry
must focus on whether ... the practice facially appears to be one that would
always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output
... or instead one designed to 'increase economic efficiency .... '8i The
concepts of competition, output, and efficiency are all used interchangeably,
just as they had been in Bork's and Bowman's early writings.
Other federal judges formerly affiliated with Chicago soon began to
espouse outputism from the bench. 8 2 Posner was appointed by President

78.

I RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE

11

(1976).

BORK, supranote 2, at 122; see also id. ("We must appraise any questioned practice . .. in
order to determine whether it contains any likelihood of creating output restriction."). To be
sure, Bork's analysis was self-contradictory at times. His treatment of productive efficiencies, for
example, suggested that even mergers to monopoly might be justified by internal cost savings to
the firm, despite clearly resulting in lower output. Id. at 107-o8. The author thanks Herb
Hovenkamp for this insight.

79.

8o. George L. Priest, Bork's Strategy and the Influence of the Chicago School on Modern Antitrust
Law, 5 7 J.L. & ECON. Si, Si 3 (2014). The ideological makeup of the Court dramatically shifted
during the 1970s, along with the replacements of Warren by Burger, Black by Powell, and
Douglas by Stevens. Interestingly, Justice Stevens-though far from the most conservative of this
new wave-had co-taught antitrust with Director at Chicago, an experience Stevens described as
"the most important intellectual experience of his life." Id. at S13-14.
81. Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979). This
language in BMIcould perhaps be read as simply a response to the particular facts at hand. The
lawsuit alleged that a horizontal joint-licensing arrangement among copyright holders violated
Sherman Act Section i. The copyright holders' primary defense was that the arrangement
increased output. Thus, the BMI opinion could simply have reflected the centrality of output
effects to the parties' competing arguments. That said, Frank Easterbrook represented the
United States as amicus curiae in his role as Deputy Solicitor General. The United States in its brief
pointed to a "decrease in production" as the fundamental cost to society from harmful cartel
agreements. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 15, Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad.
Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (Nos. 77-1578 and 77-1583). In any event, the Court's language was
subsequently quoted in multiple different contexts. Bus. Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485
U.S. 717, 723 (1988) ("decrease output") (citation omitted); Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v.
Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 289-go (1985) (same) (citation omitted).
82.
This is not meant to be a comprehensive description of the Chicago and Chicagoadjacent academia-to-judiciary pipeline, which was quite substantial. See, e.g., Clay Risen, Ralph K.
Winter Jr., a Top Conservative Judicial Mind, Dies at 85, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2020), https://
www.nytimes.com/2020/12/18/us/ralph-k-winterjr-dead.html
[https://perma.cc/ZJS-DJ7S]
("In the early 1970s [Winter] hadjoined two other law school professors, Robert H. Bork and Ward
S. Bowman Jr., in forming the East Coast outpost of the law and economics movement. . .. ").
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Reagan to the Seventh Circuit in 1981.83 Like his earlier scholarly writings,
8
Posner's judicial opinions strongly endorsed outputist analysis. 4 He also
equated output with consumer welfare, once rejecting alleged merger
efficiencies because the defendants "did not make a convincing showing that
[they] would result in a significant increase in output (which would of course
benefit consumers)."85
Robert Bork joined Posner on the bench in 1982. Unsurprisingly, Bork's
views did not change upon his becoming a federal judge. In Rothery Storage,
for example, he began by stating that "the purpose of the antitrust laws" is
86
"the promotion of consumer welfare." Bork continued, "[t]here is ... no
possibility that the [challenged] restraints can suppress market competition
8
and so decrease output," en route to holding for the defendant. 7
Frank Easterbrook, a graduate of and faculty member at Chicago, was
appointed by Reagan to the Seventh Circuit in 1984.88 Upon joining the
judiciary, Easterbrook made clear his view that all of antitrust boils down to
output analysis. "The core question in antitrust is output," he wrote in Chicago
ProfessionalSports Ltd., "[u] nless a contract reduces output in some market, to
8
the detriment of consumers, there is no antitrust problem." 9 Other cases
0
contained similar pronouncements.9 And these were not the only Chicagoan
judicial appointees to endorse outputism.9'

83.
2017),

Adam Liptak, An Exit InrView with Richard Posner,JudicialProvocateur, N.Y. TIMES (Sept i i,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/0g/11/us/politics/judge-richard-posner-retiremenLhtml

[https://perma.cc/SCT4-44HU].
84. See, e.g., Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 378 (7th Cir.
1986) ("The main economic objection to monopoly is that the monopolist restricts output
compared to what it would be under competition.").
85. FTC v. Elders Grain, Inc., 868 F.2d go1, 904 ( 7 th Cir. 1989).
Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 218 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
86.

87.

Id. at 229.

See, e.g., Emily Hoerner & Rick Tulsky, Pattern of Misstated Facts Found in Opinions of
88.
Renowned USJudgeEasterbrook, INJUSTICE WATCH (Apr. 4, 2017), https://www.injusticewatch.org/
projects/20 17 /pattern-of-misstated-facts-found-in-probe-of-renowned-federal-judges-opinions

[https://perma.cc/J2BG-LJBC].
89. Chi. Pro. Sports Ltd. P'ship v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 95 F. 3 d 593, 597 ( 7 th Cir. 1996).
go. Ball Mem'I Hosp., Inc. v. Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1335 ( 7 th Cir. 1986)
("Market power comes from the ability to cut back-the market's total output .... "); Menasha Corp.
v. News Am. Mktg. In-Store, Inc., 3 5 4 F.3 d 661, 663 ( 7 th Cir. 2004) (declaring that the only injuries
"that matter under the federal antitrust laws" are "lower output and the associated welfare losses").
g1. Douglas Ginsburg, for example, has at times given output a central role in his judicial
and academic writings. See, e.g., Superior Ct. Trial Laws. Ass'n v. FTC, 856 F.2d 226, 234 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (identifying "constriction of supply [as] the essence of (and primary concern

associated with horizontal] 'price-fixing'"), rev'd in part, 493 U.S. 411 (1 ggo); Wright & Ginsburg,
supra note i, at 2416-22 (arguing, in defense of the "welfare approach," that vertical restraints
that encourage retailer promotions are "efficient .. . in the sense that they increase output").Judge
Ginsburg, a graduate of and visiting lecturer at Chicago, was appointed by President Reagan to the
D.C. Circuit in 1986. Douglas Howard Ginsburg, L. LIBR. - AM. L. & LEGAL INFO., https://law.jrank.

org/pages/7

57

/Ginsburg-Douglas-Howard.html

[https://perma.cc/E2GS-T 5 FU].
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As the Output-Welfare Fallacy was making the leap into the judiciary,
Chicagoans were also spreading it to the highest levels of the federal antitrust
agencies. A number of Reagan-era appointees to the U.S. Department of
Justice Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission endorsed
outputism. Many had direct ties to, or were expressly influenced by, Chicago.
As one put it, "[T] here were a number of other Chicago School grads... , all
of whom essentially brought what they had learned-just like Bob Bork
brought what he had learned to The Antitrust Paradox, we brought it to the
Antitrust Division."92
Reagan's first Assistant Attorney General of the Antitrust Division was
William Baxter,93 whose tenure at Stanford Law had overlapped with that of
both Aaron Director and Richard Posner.94 Baxter swiftly brought the
Chicago gospel-including the Output-Welfare Fallacy-to the Division. In a
1982 interview, for example, he explained that "[t] he [antitrust] statutes talk
in terms of competition and restraints on trade-which I take to mean
restraints on output .... "95

92.
Rule, supra note 16, at 05:26; see also id. at 05:04 ("[In addition to Baxter] there were
...
others. I came to the Antitrust Division in late 1982. Doug Ginsburg followed shortly
thereafter. We both went on eventually to be the head of the Division .... But in addition to us
there were a number of other Chicago School grads. Ron Carr was the first, one of Bill Baxter's
deputies. But there were others, like Dale Collins, Deb Garza . .. all of whom essentially brought
what they had learned ... to the Antitrust Division.").
93.

Richard Schmalensee, Bill Baxter in the Antitrust Arena: An Economist's Appreciation, 51

STAN. L. REV. 1317, 1323 (1999).
94. Press Release, Hoover Inst., Aaron Director, Founder of the Field of Law and
Economics, Hoover Institution Fellow and Distinguished University of Chicago Economist (Sept.
14, 2004), https://www.hoover.org/press-releases/aaron-director-founder-field-law-and-economics
hoover-institution-fellow-and [https://perma.cc/G8KE-9 4 R5 ]. Director actively participated in
faculty workshops at Stanford. See id. Baxter also worked with Bork on the Neal Report in the late
1960s, though Bork dissented from the final report and Baxter later repudiated it. Herbert J.
Hovenkamp, The Neal Report and the Crisis in Antitrust (Penn L. Fac. Scholarship Working Paper,
Paper No. 1794, 2009), http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/facultyscholarship/1794 [https://

perma.cc/RDG3-QJV 4 ].

95. Antitrust Debate: The Big, The Bad, and The Beautiful, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1982, at E 5
https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/ 1982/11/21/477931 18632546.html?page
Number=171 [https://perma.cc/H2AU-XHBL]. Baxter conflated efficiency with consumer
welfare: "The antitrust statutes . .. proscrib[e] those commercial activities that are more likely
than not to reduce 'consumer welfare'-i.e., allocative and productive efficiency." WILLIAM F.
BAXTER, ANTITRUST LAW AND THE STIMULATION OF TECHNOLOGICAL INVENTION AND INNOVATION 4

(1983), https://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/file/12

3 7 5 01/download

[https://perma.cc/J 5 5 K

-AC 7 P] (Discussion Paper for the Preparatory Conference on Government Organization and
Operation and the Role of Government in the Economy) (citation omitted); see also id. ("[T]he
antitrust laws condemn only ... conduct that has as its purpose or effect the accumulation and
exercise of market power, which allows its holders to restrict output and thereby adversely to affect
resource allocation.").

THE OUTPUT-WELFAREFALLACY

2022 ]

577

James Miller III, Reagan's first Federal Trade Commission ("FTC")
Chairman,9 6 cited as his primary intellectual influences Bork, Posner, Stigler,
Demsetz, and other Chicagoans.97 Unsurprisingly, Miller endorsed output-only
antitrust. In Ethyl Corp., for example, Miller dissented from his fellow
Commissioners' decision to condemn facilitating practices among members
of a four-firm oligopoly, reasoning that such practices should be prohibited
8
only if they reduce "industry output of a ... homogeneous product."9
Charles "Rick" Rule became the third Chicagoan to head up the DOJ
Antitrust Division, following both Baxter and Douglas Ginsburg (who was
later appointed to the D.C. Circuit).99 According to Rule, the Chicago-helmed
Division embraced "the notion that output, and a practice's expected or likely
impact on output, is the critical measure of whether or not one should be
concerned about conduct.",- Under this view, analyzing anything other than
output-even price effects-is a mistake.-' In a statement that might surprise
some contemporary critics, Rule explained that analyzing price effects is "old
wine pre-AntitrustParadoxpoured into new bottles," a recipe for "deleterious
results." o2 Like Baxter and Bork, Rule treated output as being
interchangeable with both allocative efficiency and consumer welfare, and
concluded that output is the appropriate "measure" for analysis. o3
C.

ENTERING THE MAINSTREAM

During the decades that followed, the Output-Welfare Fallacy became
more and more engrained into the dominant antitrust paradigm. Today, it
pervades antitrust commentary. The venerable Areeda and Hovenkamp

Miller graduated from the economics department at the University of Virginia, where
96.
his time overlapped with that of James Buchanan. On the influence of the latter, see Sam
Tanenhaus, The Architect of the Radical Right: How the Nobel Prize-Winning Economist James M.
Buchanan Shaped Today's Antigovernment Politics, AT., July-Aug. 2017, https://www.the
[https://perma.
atlantic.com/magazine/archive/201 7 /0 7 /the-architect-of-the-radical-right/528672

cc/ZXA 5 -WQLE].
97. Eleanor M. Fox, ChairmanMiller, the Federal Trade Commission, Economics, and Rashomon,
50 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 36 (1987).
Id. at 48 (quoting In re Ethyl Corp., 1o F.T.C. 425, 656 (1983)).
Rule, the youngest-ever Division AAG, was appointed just five years after he graduated
from Chicago's law school. See Charles F. (Rick) Rule, PAUL WEISS, https://www.paulweiss.com/
professionals/partners-and-counsel/charles-f-rick-rule [https://perma.cc/W 5 GK-KNL2].

98.
99.

100.

Rule, supra note 16, at 07:56.

101.
Id. at i 1:26 ("There has been this tendency to substitute price for output as the measure
of the impact of a particular transaction.... [F]ocusing on price and the impact on price to the
).
exclusion of the impact on output is another source of deleterious results . .
Id. at 1:04:20 ("[T]o quote another Chicago Schooler, ... Ed Levi, that he used to teach
102.
in his Legal Elements class, was the notion that to some extent by converting the term 'consumer
welfare' to 'consumer surplus,' and by focusing on price rather than output, ... you can look at
some of the arguments that are being made by some of the people who take that position that

look a lot like the old wine, pre-Antitrust Paradox, poured into new bottles.").
103.
Id. at 07:5 5-

&
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treatise states that "the overall goal [of antitrust] is markets that maximize
output."''4 In its Antitrust Law Developments treatise, the ABA Section of
Antitrust Law explains that "evidence of supracompetitive pricing must be
accompanied by evidence of restricted output." 1O Former FTC Commissioner
Joshua Wright and Professor John Yun contend that "measuring output
effects ... is the central purpose and ultimate aim of welfare analysis."o6 In
his widely influential article on error costs, Easterbrook declares that "[i]f
arrangements are anticompetitive, the output and market share of those using
them must fall."1o7 Professor Thom Lambert "defin[es] competition in terms
of output, where a defendant's action is procompetitive if it leads to greater
market output and anticompetitive if it leads to a reduction in market
output.",o8 In their treatise on intellectual property and antitrust, Professors
Hovenkamp, Janis, Lemley, Leslie, and Carrier state that "[f]undamentally,
the rule of reason considers whether a restraint is output increasing or output
decreasing."o9 A recent amicus brief signed by Professors Boliek, Cooper,
Epstein, Haber, Hazlett, Hurwitz, Lambert, Lipsky, Manne, Semeraro, Teece,
Wright, Yoo, and Yun posits that "[t] he fundamental goal of antitrust law is to
foster consumer welfare by enhancing or increasing output."'0 In short,
outputism has become the "Holy Grail" of the antitrust orthodoxy."'

104.

IX AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4,

1 114a;

see also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE

ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 13 (2005) ("While we often think of antitrust

as troubled by high prices, it is better to think of antitrust's main concern in terms of restrictions
on output."). The treatise does note elsewhere that a "reduction in output is not the only measure
of anticompetitive effect." IX AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, 1 150 3 b(s).
105.

ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAw, ANTITRUST LAw DEVELOPMENTS 227 (8th ed. 2017).

1o6.

Joshua D. Wright & John M. Yun, Burdens and Balancingin Multisided Markets: The First
PrinciplesApproach of Ohio v. American Express, 54 REV. INDUS. ORG. 717, 732 (2019).
107.

Easterbrook, supranote 7, at 31.

1o8.

Thom Lambert, A Decision-TheoreticRule of Reason for Minimum Resale Price Maintenance,
BULL. 167, 174 n.28 (2010).

55 ANTITRUST
109.

HERBERT HOVENKAMP, MARK D. JANIS, MARK A. LEMLEY, CHRISTOPHER R. LESLIE

MICHAEL A. CARRIER, IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO

INTELLECPUAL PROPERTY LAW § 7.03[A] ( 3 d ed. 2017). To be sure, at least some of these authors
have explicitly recognized elsewhere that output and welfare are not perfectly interchangeable.
See, e.g., SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 462 ("Once this assumption [that different consumers
value point-of-sale services differently] is made, it can no longer be shown that any particular
instance of [vertical resale price maintenance] is efficient, even if it increases output. Some are
and some are not."). The relevant point for present purposes is that the more general statements
equating output with welfare remain in circulation and, more importantly, both reflect and have
impacted the development of antitrust doctrine.
110.
Brief for Antitrust L. & Econ. Scholars as Amicus Curiae Supporting of Respondents,
supra note 6, at 3.

1Il. See Crane, supra note 23, at 326 (arguing that antitrust should not blindly seek to
increase output in "net-harm" industries like tobacco). Crane's Article stands as one of the few
existing exceptions to the outputist orthodoxy. It is narrow in scope, however-focusing solely
on the "harmful products" issue-and offers correspondingly narrow normative prescriptions. Id.
at 339.
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The Output-Welfare Fallacy is also passed down in the classroom to
successive generations of future antitrust enforcers, attorneys, and judges. At
least as far back as Edward Levi's tenure at Chicago, it was being taught in lawschool courses."2 This remains true today. For example, in a widely used
antitrust casebook authored by Professors Sullivan, Hovenkamp, Shelanski,
and Leslie, students learn, as early as the second page, that "[a] bsent a finding
of output limitation, the conduct is deemed efficient and beyond the
condemnation of the antitrust laws.""3
This decades-long ascendance culminated in 2018, when the U.S.
Supreme Court decided AmEx.'4 The case is explored further infra; for
present purposes a brief summary will suffice. At issue were certain
contractual provisions between a credit-card network and the merchants who
accept its cards as payment for goods and services. AmEx's "no-steering" rules
forbade merchants from presenting any particular credit-card network in a
differentiated way to their customers-no offering discounts for paying with
Discover, no saying "We Prefer MasterCard," etc."5 The trial court found that
AmEx's no-steering rules had increased retail prices for nearly every
6
consumer product sold in the United States (among other ill effects)," and
that AmEx did not pass through all of its supracompetitive profits to
cardmembers in the form of rewards.,7
During oral arguments, Justice Gorsuch, a consummate antitrust
insider," 8 was the first to interject:
JUSTICE GORSUCH: We're not here to protect competitors,
right .... ? Or - or necessarily even merchants. The antitrust laws
are aimed at protecting consumers; you'd agree with that? . . . So,

112.

Rule, supra note 16, at 1:04:20.

SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 2. A few pages later, the reader learns that "the
113.
Supreme Court has accepted gradually the economic objectives of efficiency and increased
consumer welfare as the underlying policies of antitrust.. . ." Id. at 4. Thus, the reader is quickly
introduced to the idea that output, (allocative) efficiency, and consumer welfare are effectively
interchangeable. To be sure, these propositions are later qualified. Id. at 461 ("As a general rule,
an output increase is a good sign that a practice is efficient.").
Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 1 3 8 S. Ct. 22 7 4 (2018).
United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F.Supp.3d 143,
F. 3 d 179 (2d Cir. 2016).
114.

115.

165

(E.D.N.Y. 2015), rev'd, 838

to
Id. at 216 ("Even if [AmEx] passed through every cent of its premium ...
116.
cardholders-which it does not-customers who do not carry or qualify for an Amex card are
nonetheless subject to higher retail prices at the merchant . ... ").

Id.
117.
See, e.g., John M. Newman, The Antitrus Jurisprudenceof Neil Gorsuch, 45 FLA. ST. U. L.
118.
REv. 225, 226 (2017) ("Like Justice Stevens, Gorsuch both practiced antitrust law as an attorney
and taught antitrust as a professor.").
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given that, there's no evidence of restricted output in this case,
correct?' 9
Justice Kennedy's first question similarly invoked outputism:
JUSTICE KENNEDY: [C]ould you comment on the brief of the
antitrust law and economic scholars in favor of Respondents? They
said for us to focus on output.
They had indeed-the amicus brief in question referred to output effects as
"the sine qua non"' and "the touchstone" of antitrust analysis.122
Both Gorsuch and Kennedy joined the majority opinion, which strongly
endorsed outputism. Justice Thomas,.23 writing for a 5-4 majority, began by
quoting the leading treatise: "Market power is the ability to raise price
profitably by restrictingoutput."124 (Thomas added the emphasis.) The opinion
admitted that AmEx's restraints had caused higher prices without yielding
equivalent offsetting benefits.25 Nonetheless, marketwide output had been
increasing over the relevant time period. 26 Because the plaintiffs had not
proven that AmEx's conduct had reduced output, their case failed-again,
despite a factual record replete with evidence of actual harm. 27 As Justice
Breyer noted in dissent, the majority effectively held "that even net price
increases do not matter after all, absent a showing of lower output."128
AmEx is the U.S. Supreme Court's clearest endorsement of output-only
antitrust. The majority opinion's fixation on output may be surprising to
critics more accustomed to thinking of the Chicago School and the

i 1g.

Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S.Ct. 2274 (2018) (No.

16-1454).
120.

Id. at 1o-i1.

121.
Brief for Antitrust L. & Econ. Scholars as Amicus Curiae Supporting of Respondents,
supra note 6, at 3122.

Id.

123.
Two of Thomas's previous assays into antitrust rule-making are generally regarded as
poorly reasoned. See, e.g.,Jonathan B. Baker, TheProblem with Baker Hughes andSyufy: On the Role
of Entry in MergerAnalysis, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 353, 365-71 (1997) (discussing problems associated

with United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 9o8 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir.

1990));

Chris Sagers, Platforms,

American Express, and the Problem of Complexity in Antitrust, 98 NEB. L. REv. 389, 393 (2019)
("[Texaco v.] Dagher... was quickly rendered essentially irrelevant by American Needle.").
124.
Ohio v. Am. Express. Co., 1 3 8 S. Ct. 2274, 2288 (2018) (quoting AREEDA & HOVENKAMP,
supra note 4,1 5.01)See id.
125.

126.

Id.

127.
Id.; see also id. at 2289 ("The plaintiffs also failed to prove that Amex's antisteering
provisions have stifled competition among credit-card companies. To the contrary, while these
agreements have been in place, the credit-card market experienced expanding output ... .").
128.
Id. at 2302 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Michael L. Katz & A. Douglas Melamed,
Competition Law as Common Law: American Express and the Evolution of Antitrust, 168 U. PA. L. REv.
2061, 2095 (2020) ("In effect ... the Court held that, at least absent direct proof of the often
unobservable competitive price, proof of harm to competition requires proof of reduced
output.").
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contemporary antitrust enterprise as being overly focused on prices. AmEx
stands for the opposite proposition: output trumps all else, even prices.
*

*

As the foregoing historical analysis reveals, AmEx did not emerge from a
vacuum. The roots of outputism run deep. Antitrust insiders pass it amongst
each other, and to each new generation, in the sacred texts of the discipline.
Of course, its hold is not complete. It does not explain every single judicial
opinion, nor does it drive every enforcement decision. There is broad
consensus, for example, that garden-variety cartel agreements should be
condemned even without proof of an actual output reduction. 29 But cases
like AmEx are the only kind in which the choice of means and ends actually
matters. And in AmEx, output was deployed as the exclusive criterion for
analysis, just as orthodox commentators have long urged.
The stakes are high. Outputism is an exceptionally narrow vision for
antitrust, as the AmEx case itself makes clear. It is difficult to conceive of a
more harmful restraint than one that has endured for decades in a highly
concentrated market, stifles innovation, is highly regressive, and increases the
cost of nearly every good and service sold in the United States.'30 Nonetheless,
outputism was used to justify dismissing the case and allowing those harms to
go unremedied.
Such a narrow lens ought to be employed only if its foundations are
exceptionally solid. As we have seen, antitrust outputism rests on the
assumption that output is effectively interchangeable with, and can therefore
be used as a reliable metric for, consumer welfare. The following discussion
explains why that assumption-widely held though it may be-is unsound and
unwarranted.
III. DECOUPLING OUTPUT AND WELFARE

Output and welfare diverge in myriad ways. These can be organized into
three broad categories of conduct and market dynamics. First, a number of
strategies can increase output, yet reduce welfare. The inverse is also true: a
variety of conduct can reduce output, yet increase welfare. Second, conduct
that affects multiple products can cause conflicting output effects and
See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007)
129.
("Restraints that are per se unlawful include horizontal agreements among competitors to fix
prices, or to divide markets.") (citations omitted). But cf Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad.
Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 22, 22 n.40 (1979) (prescribing the lenient Rule of Reason for a horizontal
price-setting agreement because it was "unlikely to cause decreased output").
After Australia prohibited no-steering rules like the one at issue in AmEx, retail prices
130.
nationwide declined sharply enough to noticeably lower the country's overall Consumer Price
Index. See Brief for Australian Retailers Ass'n as Amicus Curiae in Supporting Petitioners at * 19,
Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 1 3 8 S. Ct. 2274 (2018) (No.16-1 4 5 4 ) ("Importantly, these benefits to
consumers have often gone to those most in need.").
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conflicting welfare effects. Third, conduct can be harmful without causing a
corresponding output reduction. What emerges is a broad decoupling of
concepts previously thought to be effectively interchangeable. If these were
scattered or unimportant instances, they could be ignored. But taken
together, they compel the conclusion that output effects cannot serve as the
exclusive "criterion"'3' or "measure"'32 of consumer welfare. Along the way, a
corollary point emerges: outputism also fails to reflect substantial portions of
existing doctrine and practice. Thus, the Output-Welfare Fallacy exhibits
fatal flaws in both its normative (antitrust should focus exclusively on output
effects) and descriptive (antitrust does focus exclusively on output) modes.
A.

DIVERGENT OUTPUTAND WELFARE EFFECTS

A variety of strategies-including some that are quite well-recognized by
antitrust law-can have the effect of increasing output while simultaneously
reducing welfare. These include creating or maintaining information
asymmetries, deception and misleading, predatory pricing, coercive practices
like tying, intrabrand vertical restraints, externalizing costs, and exploiting
cognitive limits. And the inverse is true as well: a variety of conduct can decrease
output while simultaneously increasingwelfare.All of the examples below have
been and are of central importance to antitrust law. Some (vertical intrabrand
restraints, tying, predatory pricing, deception, etc.) are frequent targets of
litigation. Others (alleviating information asymmetries, preventing negative
externalities, etc.) are often the basis for defendants' procompetitive
justifications. The following discussion reveals three key points: (1) output
and welfare effects often move in opposite directions; (2) the Output-Welfare
Fallacy will therefore often yield incorrect prescriptions;'33 and (3) actual
doctrine and practice are frequently at odds with the outputist framework.
1.

Creating, Exploiting, or Alleviating Information
Asymmetries

An information asymmetry exists where one party to a transaction
possesses more relevant information than another party.134 Firms can actively
create, maintain, and exploit information asymmetries. On the other hand,
firms can also work to alleviate such asymmetries. Any of these strategies can
cause divergent output and welfare effects.

131.

132.

Bork, Rule of Reason II, supra note
Rule, supra note 16, at 07:55.

17,

at 375.

133. Assuming, of course, that consumer welfare is the exclusive goal of antitrust-an
assumption that appears to be universally endorsed by proponents of outputist antitrust.
134. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemins": Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 489 (1970).
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Conduct that creates or maintains an information asymmetry can
increase output of the relevant product. 13 Yet such conduct can also reduce
welfare. Lacking adequate information about relative costs and benefits, the
targeted parties may overpay, forego better alternatives, or otherwise enter
into harmful transactions. 3
FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists offers a high-profile example of an
agreement to maintain an information asymmetry.137 Insurance companies in
Indiana had begun reimbursing dentists only for the "least expensive []
8
adequate course of ... treatment."'3 The insurers had also begun requesting
"any dental x rays ... used by the dentist in examining the patient," in order
to assess whether a given procedure met that standard.'39 If not, the insurers
would not pay for it. A group of dentists collectively refused to transmit x-rays
to insurers.40 According to the FTC, that agreement artificially propped up
demand for dental services, thereby harming insurers and patients.,4, In other
words, the agreement had the effect of increasing output of the relevant
services while reducing consumer welfare. Outputist analysis would conclude
that the conduct was legal, even procompetitive. But a unanimous U.S.
Supreme Court held that the dentists' conduct violated Sherman Act Section
1, implicitly rejecting the Output-Welfare Fallacy.142 Moreover, this category
is broader than naked limitations on information flows-tying, for example,
Akerlof's pioneering work on information asymmetries focused on the relationship
135.
between product quality and lack of information on the part of buyers. See id. at 488. He
contended that such markets will yield lower-quality products, and therefore less demand and
lower (perhaps even zero) market activity. Id. But the model depended on a number of
conditions that may or may not be present, including high-quality and low-quality versions of the
same good, that prospective buyers know ex ante of the risk that goods will be low-quality, that
buyers can (again, ex ante) at least roughly assess the costs and benefits associated with both lowand high-quality versions, and more. In short, information asymmetries do not inevitably lead to
lower or zero output; they may instead have the opposite effect. On the non-generalizability of
Akerlof's model, see Steven Salop &Joseph Stiglitz, Bargainsand Ripoffs: A Model of Monopolistically
Competitive PriceDispersion, 44 REv. EcoN. STUD. 493, 493-94 (1977).
E.g., Maurice E. Stucke, Ilow Do (and Should) Competition Authorities Treat a Dominant
136.
Firm's Deceptions, 63 SMU L. REv. 1069, 1073-74 (2010). Thus, for example, a customer might
pay too much for a car that-unbeknownst to her-has a failing transmission. At a market level,
this over-buying yields a deadweight loss. Aidan R. Vining & David L. Weimer, Information
Asymmetry FavoringSellers: A Policy Framework, 21 POL'Y SC. 281, 283-84 (1988) (noting that sellerfavoring information asymmetries also transfer surplus to sellers).
137.

138.
139.

FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 449 (1986).
Id. at 4 61.
Id. at 4 4 9.

140.

Id. at 4 5 1.
Id. at 451-52. A skeptic might argue that the dentists' conduct decreased "quality141.
adjusted" output, and thus fits within the outputist framework. But recall that the insurers were
at least nominally seeking x-rays in order to reduce prices by inducing patients to consume lowestcost "adequate" procedures. Id. at 449. Many higher-cost procedures were presumably of higher
quality. Id. at 448. If anything, the dentists' conduct, which was designed to facilitate delivery of
higher-cost procedures, likely increased quality-adjusted output.
142.

A unanimous Supreme Court agreed with the Commission. Id. at 453.
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can create an information asymmetry, as recognized by the Court in Jefferson
Parish.143
Firms can also exploit existing information asymmetries via deceptive or
misleading conduct. In the same vein, the success of a tying strategy may
depend on consumers' lack of information.,44 Conduct that exploits an
information asymmetry can increase consumer demand-and therefore
output-while simultaneously harming those very consumers.145 The history
of U.S. antitrust enforcement is replete with examples of anticompetitive
deception and misleading conduct.'46 As early as 1913, the Supreme Court
held that such behavior can fall within the scope of the Sherman Act. 47 The
D.C. Circuit's seminal Microsoft III decision held that Microsoft's deceptive
conduct vis-a-vis app developers violated the Sherman Act.148 Here again, the
Output-Welfare Fallacy fails to describe both real-world dynamics and
substantial portions of contemporary antitrust doctrine.
Alternatively, firms can act to alleviate or prevent the exploitation of
information asymmetries. Such conduct may reduce output, yet may also

Justice Stevens observed that tying arrangements might impair consumers' "freedom to
143.
select the best bargain in the second market" because of "an inability to evaluate the true cost of
either product when they are available only as a package." Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v.
Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15 (1984), abrogated by Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28
(2006). This is especially likely in markets that exhibit substantial pre-existing information
asymmetries. Jefferson Par. Hosp., 466 U.S. at 15 n.24 ("Especially where market imperfections
exist, purchasers may not be fully sensitive to the price or quality implications of a tying
arrangement, and hence it may impede competition on the merits."). Stevens's reasoning on this
point is admittedly somewhat fuzzy, as he later emphasized that the power created by a favorable
information asymmetry is distinct from antitrust-relevant market power. Id. at 27. Perhaps his
earlier statement is best understood as being directed at harm, rather than power.
144.

Indeed, a tying strategy may depend on a lack of information. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak

Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 473-76 (1992).
145.
E.g., Mark R. Patterson, Coercion, Deception, and Other Demand-Increasing Practices in
by
Antitrust Law, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. i, 5 (1997) ("[D]eception exploit[s] consumers ...
increasing consumers' demand for their products ...
through providing them with false
information.. . ."). Along with Crane, supra note 23, Patterson's article stands as one of very few
exceptions to the outputist orthodoxy. It is, however, generally limited to coercion and deception,
with correspondingly narrow prescriptions. See id.
Of course, some deceptive or misleading conduct may have the net effect of decreasing
146.
both output and welfare. This may have been true of the conduct at issue in In re Intel Corp., 150
F.T.C. 420, 422-27 (2010). According to the FTC, Intel engaged in a multifaceted campaign
aimed at deceiving customers into believing that Intel's processors were faster than its rivals'
processors. To the extent that Intel's strategy allowed it to charge a higher price than would have
prevailed absent its conduct, overall market output may have been lower as a result-but this
would not necessarily be the case. The deception could have stimulated more customer purchases
than would have otherwise occurred. See John M. Newman, Anticompetitive Product Design in the
New Economy, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 681, 723-25 (2012).
147.
See Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 374-75 (1913); see also Stucke, supra note
136, at 1083.
148.
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F. 3 d 34, 45-46, 74-75 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(condemning Microsoft's deception of developers regarding the attributes of its "Java Virtual
Machine").
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increase consumer welfare. The Supreme Court's CaliforniaDental decision,
for example, involved a horizontal agreement among dentists to limit
deception and misleading conduct. 49 The Court explained that such an
agreement "could have different effects from those 'normally' found in the
commercial world, even to the point of promoting competition."5o As a
result, the Court held that the challenged restraint deserved full rule-ofreason analysis.,5,
Mandatory-disclosure rules can have similar effects. Standard-setting
organizations, for example, often agree to mandate disclosure of relevant
information.1s2 Where consumers are unaware of health or safety risks of a
product, output of that product will likely be higher-and welfare lower
-than in a world of perfect information.'53 An agreement to disclose relevant
information can thus reduce output but increase welfare. The outputist
framework would presumably condemn such conduct on the basis that it
lowered output. Yet standard-setting activity generally receives lenient
treatment.154 Yet again, the Output-Welfare Fallacy fails to reflect not only
real-world dynamics, but also important parts of existing antitrust doctrine
and practice.
2.

Externalizing Costs

By externalizing costs, market participants can sometimes increase
output while reducing consumer welfare. The costs of production, trading,
and consumption are not always borne by manufacturers and consumers.
"Externalities," or spillover effects, arise in a variety of marketplace settings.
They can be positive. A classic example, widely recognized in antitrust law and
economics, involves retailer promotional activities. 55 Such efforts can create
a positive externality, upon which a second retailer across the street may be
able to free ride.156
Externalities can also be negative, as antitrust courts have also
recognized.157 Whenever firms are able to externalize the costs of doing

149.
150.

Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 760 (i999).
Id. at 773.

Id. at 77 4 -81.
David A. Balto, Former Assistant Dir. of Pol'y & Evaluation, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Speech
at the Cutting Edge Antitrust Law Seminars International: Standard Setting in the New Economy
(Feb. 17, 2ooo), https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2000/02/standard-setting-networkeconomy [https://perma.cc/AVC9-L28M].
151.

152.

See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
Herbert Hovenkamp, Are Regulatory Agreements to Address Climate Change Anticompetitive?,
REGUL. REV. (Sept. 11, 2019), https://www.theregreview.org/o19/og/11/hovenkamp-are-

153.
154.

regulatory-agreements-to-address-climate-change-anticompetitive

[https://perma.cc/P 5 S7-LXQW].

155.

See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 901-02 (2007).

156.

Id. at 903-04See, e.g., Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2288-89 (2o18). Justice Thomas's

157.

opinion also went on to declare that AmEx's restraints actually alleviated a negative externality.
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business-or where consumers can externalize the costs of consumption
-output of the relevant product will likely increase.15 8 This can, of course, be
allocatively inefficient and harmful to societal welfare.'59 But consumer
welfare can also decrease. Negative externalities, when imposed selectively,
can increase demand and output of a relevant product.,Go Yet all consumers,
including those of the relevant product, may be left worse off.
Credit-card networks offer a ready example. Networks commonly offer
cardholders "rewards" perks in the form of travel discounts, cash back, etc.' 61
But those rewards are not costless. Credit cards are costly for merchants to
accept, and rewards cards are often the most costly of all.62 Many merchants
would naturally prefer to pass those costs on to the relatively wealthy
customers who trigger them. 6 3 But contractual restraints imposed by card
networks prevent merchants from doing so.'64 As a result, merchants must
pass on their increased costs via higher across-the-board retail prices. 6 5 Thus,
card networks and cardholder-consumers are able to externalize some costs
onto other consumers. 66 This arrangement increases demand for card
usage,' 67 while leaving non-cardholders unambiguously worse off.
Even the cardholders who receive rewards may be worse off. Card
networks do not pass through ioo percent of their supracompetitive profits
to cardholders. 68 Thus, rewards programs can impose a prisoners' dilemma.
If no consumers "defect" by beginning to use rewards cards, all will enjoy
lower retail prices. At the same time, individual consumers are incentivized to

Id. at 2889. They did not. SeeJohn M. Newman, ProcompetitiveJustificationsin Antitrust Law, 94 IND.
L.J. 501, 543-44 n.321 (2019). The supposed "negative externality"Justice Thomas had in mind
was nothing of the sort. Moreover, Justice Thomas cited as fact a portion of the trial court's
opinion that actually described one of the defendant's arguments-an argument that the trial
court rejected as factually unsupported. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2289; see alsoJohn Newman,
Ohio v. American Express: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, CONCURRENTIALISTE:J. ANTITRUST L.
(July 16, 2018), https://econcurrentialiste.com/ohio-v-amex [https://perma.cc/LEQ2-KSNV].
158. E.g., RICHARD A. POSNER & FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST CASEs, ECONOMIC
NOTES, AND OTHER MATERIALS 176 (2d ed. i 9 8i); Jeffrey L. Harrison, Other Markets, Other Costs:
ModernizingAntitrust, 27 U. FLA.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 373, 385-86 (2o16).
159.

Harrison, supra note 158, at 386-87.

16o.

Matthew G. Nagler, The Strategic Significance of Negative Externalities, 35 MANAGERIAL
DECISION EcON. 247, 248 (2014).
161.
See, e.g., United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3 d 143,
rev'd, 838 F. 3 d 179 (2d Cir. 2016).
162.

Id. at 1 5 8.

163.

Id. at 216.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 216-17.

164.
165.
166.

156

(E.D.N.Y. 2015),

167.
See Matthew G. Nagler, Negative Externalities, Competition and Consumer Choice, 59J. INDUS.
EcON. 396, 396-97 (201 1) (finding that SUVs and trucks impose this type of externality and that
demand for them is positively responsive to it).

168. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3 d at 215 ("Amex's ... price increases were not wholly offset
by additional rewards expenditures or otherwise passed through to cardholders. . . .").
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defect, in order to receive rewards. Costly credit cards thereby function as
"combatant goods": they minimize the harm to users, while increasing harm
on non-users.' 69 Yet once everyone defects, all must pay higher prices-and
again, the fact that networks retain a portion means that the rewards paid out
will not necessarily fully offset the price increases. Especially in markets where
fewer non-cardholder customers are available to subsidize rewards points,
even cardholders can suffer.170 Once again, output may increase while
consumer welfare-whether defined broadly or narrowly-decreases.
It follows, then, that alleviatinga negative externality can reduce output
of a relevant product yet increase consumer welfare.'7, For example, in 2019,
a subset of automakers agreed amongst themselves and with the state of
California to meet that state's relatively lofty emissions-reduction targets
across all of their vehicles sold in the United States.172 Such agreements can
be welfare enhancing.173 Yet, at the same time, the automakers' agreement
had the potential to reduce output of the participants' products. Meeting
stricter environmental regulations can require R&D expenditures and/or
increase the marginal costs of production, either of which might translate into
higher prices and lower demand.174 Outputism identifies conduct that
reduces output as the primary-indeed, the only-legitimate target of
antitrust law. Yet "stem [ming] negative externalities" is often said to be
procompetitive.75 And although the Antitrust Division opened an
investigation into the automakers' agreement, it was subsequently closed
6
without any action being taken.17 Here again, outputism does not appear to
reflect important parts of contemporary antitrust doctrine and practice.

See Nagler, supra note 167, at 396-97 (offering SUVs as an example of this dynamic).
See, e.g., id. at 398 (labeling this the "'if-you-can't-beat-'em-join-'em' ... effect").
For a thorough discussion, see generally OECD, POLIcY ROUNDTABLEs: HORIZONTAL
171.
AGREEMENTS IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT (201 o), http://www.oecd.org/competition/cartels/
169.

170.

491 3 9867.pdf [https://perma.cc/R783-LEY2].

The involvement of the State of California would likely raise Noerrissues in any antitrust
172.
litigation involving these or similar facts. The author thanks Spencer Weber Waller for this

insight.
They can enhance social welfare or, under the right circumstances, welfare of
173.
consumers of the relevant product. Those circumstances may admittedly be rare, and public
action is generally preferable to private-cartel action. See Maarten Pieter Schinkel & Luks Toth,
CompensatoryPublic Good Provisionby a Private Cartel, TINBERGEN INST., March 2020, at 30-31, https://
6
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=35ogo 2 [https://perma.cc/TZSg-K268?type=image].
But in a given antitrust case, the judge does not have the liberty of selecting between public
regulation or regulation-by-cartel. Instead, the question is whether to condemn the challenged
conduct.
174.
Hovenkamp, supra note

175.

154.

Ohio v. Am. Express Co.,

i38

S. Ct. 2274, 2289 (2018).

Coral Davenport,Justice Department DropsAntitrust ProbeAgainst Automakers That Sided with
California on Emissions, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/o2/07/
climate/trump-california-automakers-antitrust.html [https://perma.cc/WH2V-FR7M].
176.
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Coercion

Multiple marketplace strategies can be thought of as "coercive." These
run the gamut from contractual tying,177 to designing a product so as to
foreclose interoperability with rivals' complementary products (so-called
"technological tying"),178 to more subtly guiding individuals toward desired
behaviors,'79 to issuing outright threats.8o Each of these strategies can have
the purpose and effect of increasing output.' 8' Yet each can harm consumers.
As to contractual tying, courts and scholars have long recognized that
using power over one product (the "tying" product) to coerce purchases of
another (the "tied" product) can be anticompetitive.' 8 2 Such strategies rather
obviously have the purpose and effect of increasing output of the seller's tied
product. To the extent that tying forces purchases of the tied product that
would not have otherwise occurred-i.e., buyers would not have purchased
the tied product even from a rival absent the coercive tie-marketwide tiedproduct output will increase. Nonetheless, contractual tying can be harmful. 83
Technological tying and outright threats can have similar effects. The
seminal Microsoft case involved, in part, a technological tie-in.' 8 4 Microsoft
engaged in a variety of product-design practices that functionally linked its
Windows operating system ("OS") to its Internet Explorer web browser.' 85 By
causing some consumers to receive web browsers who would otherwise not
have used any browser, Microsoft's conduct almost certainly increased output
177. IX AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, 1 17.01 ("This chapter examines 'tying' (or
'tie-in') arrangements by which a seller of one product 'forces' customers to take a second product
as well .... ").

146,

178.

See Newman, supra note

179.

See Gregory Day & Abbey Stemler, Are Dark PatternsAnticompetitive?, 72 ALA. L. REV. 1, 2

at 683.

(2020).

18o. See generally Einer Elhauge, Contrived Threats Versus Uncontrived Warnings: A General
Solution to the Puzzles of ContractualDuress, UnconstitutionalConditions, and Blackmail, 83 U. CiHi. L.
REv. 503 (2016) (discussing the difference between a coercive "threat" and a mere "warning").
181.
The foundational work in this area is Patterson's excellent and thorough treatment. See
generally Patterson, supra note 145, at 5 ("[D]evelop[ing] an antitrust approach to evaluating
practices, like coercion and deception, by which sellers seek to increase demand for their
products.").
182.

See, e.g., Times-Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 614 (1953); IX
4, 1 1700.

AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note

183.
See generally Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly
Profit Theoy, 123 HARv. L. REV. 397 (2009) (describing the harm of contractual tying to
consumers and the general welfare). For a time, many antitrust theorists were of the opinion that
tying could not create anticompetitive effects. Id. at 399-400. Their arguments were based on
the "single monopoly profit" theory, according to which tying was supposed to be an irrational
way to exercise market power. Id. But subsequent theoretical work demonstrates that the singlemonopoly-profit theory holds only under a single set of highly unrealistic assumptions, and that
tying can certainly harm both consumer and total welfare. Id. at 400-01.
...

184.
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F. 3 d 34, 85 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting "Microsoft
bound Windows and IE" but argued the two "are not 'separate products"').

185.

Id. at 45-
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of the tied product. 86 Nonetheless, as the D.C. Circuit recognized, most of
Microsoft's design-related conduct was harmful.187 As to outright threats,
Patterson points to an episode in which Moody's threatened to publicize an
unsolicited negative rating of a bond issuer's creditworthiness if the issuer did
88
That example did not yield actual
not buy credit ratings from Moody's.
antitrust litigation, but here again, Microsoft is instructive-the D.C. Circuit's
8
opinion condemned a threat by Microsoft as anticompetitive.' 9 This is yet
another instance in which outputism fails to reflect actual antitrust doctrine.
4.

Intrabrand Vertical Restraints

Intrabrand vertical restraints can increase output, yet reduce consumer
welfare. This category of conduct includes exclusive-territory agreements,
resale-price maintenance agreements, and similar arrangements. The
consensus view is that such agreements either increase output and welfare or
(rarely) decrease output and welfare. But intrabrand vertical restraints can
0
actually increase output while reducing welfare, or vice versa.'9
Bork used the output-equals-welfare proposition to conclude that
intrabrand vertical restraints must be procompetitive. His primary assumption
was that manufacturers will enter into such agreements only if the restraints
increase sales.'9' To Bork, both manufacturers and consumers want retailers
to undertake various demand-increasing promotional activities and services
(e.g., training a knowledgeable sales staff or maintaining a clean showroom
floor).192 Absent vertical restraints, he argued, promotional retail activities
and services can be subject to free-riding by rival dealers.'93 Thus, the purpose
of such restraints "must be to increase efficiency."'91 As a result, Bork argued
that vertical intrabrand restraints should become per se legal. '95 Other

186.

See id. at 51.

Id. at 7 4
Patterson, supra note 145, at 1-4.
One of Microsoft's anticompetitive practices consisted of pressuring Intel to stop
189.
developing a Windows-compatible "JavaVirtual Machine," a technology Microsoft believed could
erode its power in the PC operating-systems market. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3 d at 74. As the D.C.
Circuit put it, "Microsoft threatened Intel that if it did not stop .... then Microsoft would refuse
187.

188.

to distribute Intel technologies bundled with Windows." Id. at 77.
igo. The author thanks Steve Salop for flagging this issue.
Bork, Rule of Reason II, supra note 17, at 403. Relying on the single monopoly profit
191.
theory, Bork extended his argument to include sellers with monopoly power. Id.

192.
193.

Id. at 438-39, 438-39 n.135Id. at 382.

194.

Id. at 404.

195.

Id. at 397 ("The thesis advanced here is that every vertical arrangement should be

lawful."); see also Robert H. Bork, Vertical Restraints: Schwinn Overruled, 1977 SUP. CT. REV.

171,

173 ("There are no distinctions to be made among [vertical restraints]. They should be either all
illegal perse or all unqualifiedly lawful.").
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Chicagoans, including Posner and Easterbrook, reached the same conclusion.'96
The law of vertical restraints today largely reflects, in both tone and substance,
the prescriptions urged by Bork, Posner, and their intellectual brethren.'97
But the Chicagoan position ignored the possibility-indeed, the reality
-that consumers are not all identical. Different consumers attach different
levels of importance to various dealer promotions and services. An expert
customer, for example, often derives little or no value from a retailer's
knowledgeable sales staff. Wherever any such differences exist, the supposed
link between output and consumer welfare is broken. 98 Manufacturers make
decisions based on how marginal consumers will respond-yet a restraint's
welfare effects are felt by all consumers.'99 Add-on services are intended to
attract marginal consumers, but typically result in higher prices to all
consumers. Inframarginal consumers will keep buying at the higher price, so
the restraint leaves them worse off.2oo
These consumer-welfare losses are depicted in Figure I, below. On the left
is a market with a monopolist manufacturer and competitive distribution. Absent
a vertical restraint, the demand curve is D,, the manufacturer produces quantity
Q. and sells at price P,.201 Consumer surplus is the area within triangle aPb.
Suppose there are two groups of consumers: those who would value addon services ("marginal") and those who would not ("inframarginal"). On the
right of Figure 1, the inframarginal customers are arrayed along ac. The addon dealer services cause the marginal customers arrayed along cf to value the
product at a level equal to P2 . At the same time, the add-on services shift
demand)D, from the original demand curve in parallel to eD2 .The new demand
curve is aceD2 . Price is set at P2, resulting in output of Q2. The restraint increases
output while simultaneously lowering consumer surplus, which now consists of
aP2c.

196.
See D. Daniel Sokol, The Transformation of Vertical Restraints: Per Se Illegality, the Rule of
Reason, and Per Se Legality, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 1003, 1004 n.6 (2014); POSNER, supra note 78, at
165; Frank H. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangementsand the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 135, 135
(1984) ("No practice a manufacturer uses to distribute its products should be a subject of serious
antitrust attention.").
Sokol, supra note 196, at 1005 ("For several types of vertical restraints, the rule of reason
197.
has in practice meant near per se legality .... ").
198.
William S. Comanor, The Two Economics of Vertical Restraints, 5 REv. INDUS. ORG. 99, 107
(199o); see also William S. Comanor & John B. Kirkwood, Resale Price Maintenance and Antitrust
Policy, 3 CONTEMP. ECON. POL'Y 9 , 12 n.5 (1985) ("Bork and Posner too readily convert a result
in positive economics-that RPM increases dealer services and output-into a conclusion in
normative economics-that efficiency is improved.").
199.

Comanor & Kirkwood, supra note 198, at 12-13.

200.
This implicitly assumes that the relevant market is not perfectly competitive due to some
degree of product differentiation and/or market power.

201. For ease of explication, marginal revenue and marginal cost curves are omitted.
Comanor offers a fuller diagrammatic depiction, albeit at some cost to readability for a general
audience. William S. Comanor, Vertical Price-Fixing, VerticalMarket Restrictions, and the New Antitrust
Policy, 98 HARv. L. REv. 983, 993, 996 (1985).
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This effect can occur whenever add-on services offer less value to
inframarginal consumers than to marginal consumers-as is very often the
case. The various services Bork and others envisioned mostly entail providing
information to consumers. Such information may be valuable to marginal
consumers. But it is worth very little to most inframarginal consumers, who
already highly value the product.2o2 Relatedly, the more established the
product is in the marketplace, the more likely it is that the harm to
20
inframarginal consumers will outweigh the benefits to marginal consumers. 3
This can hold true even if the restraint "is [also] being used to combat free
riding."204 In sum, "a tendency toward [s] welfare reductions seems more likely
than the opposite."205

5.

Price Predation, With or Without Recoupment

Predatory pricing can increase output, yet reduce welfare. Throughout
nearly all of antitrust history, predatory pricing has been identified as a means
6
of excluding rivals and suppressing competition.20 The contemporary legal
standard, however, is of more recent vintage. In its 1993 Brooke Group opinion,
the U.S. Supreme Court identified two elements required for a violation.2o7
202.

Id. at 999.

203.

Id.

See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 461.
F.M. SCHERER & DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
205.
PERFORMANCE 548 ( 3 d ed. 19go); Comanor, supra note 198, at 107. Bork, Posner, and
Easterbrook mistakenly believed that such restraints can be harmful only by facilitating horizontal
collusion at the manufacturer or retail level. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 196, at 141 ("The
argument must be that restricted dealing can facilitate a real cartel .... "). But vertical intrabrand
restraints can be exclusionary. By raising rivals' distribution costs, they can reduce the incentive
and ability of new firms to enter, and of existing firms to compete. See Krattenmaker & Salop,
204.

supra note 24, at 234-38.
See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 7-8, 42-43 (1911)
2o6.
(discussing Standard Oil's monopolistic behavior in the oil market amidst the history of
monopolistic trade practices); see also Christopher R. Leslie, Revisiting the Revisionist History of
Standard Oil, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 573, 573, 575 n.so (2012) ("The Supreme Court condemned a
range of conduct by Standard Oil as anticompetitive, including predatory pricing.").
207.

Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222-27 (1993).
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First, plaintiffs must prove that the defendant set prices below its own internal
costs during a "predation period."2o 8 Second, plaintiffs must prove that the
defendant has already recouped, or is likely to recoup, all of its losses via
supracompetitive prices during a "recoupment" period.209 The Brooke Group
Court's rationale for imposing this two-pronged standard was that absent total
recoupment, "predatory pricing produces lower aggregate prices in the
market, and consumer welfare is enhanced."21o
But this elides the fact that predatory pricing can affect two different
groups of consumers. The Brooke Group narrative imagines below-cost pricing
in a single relevant market, to be - followed by recoupment via
supracompetitive pricing of that same product in that same market-hence
its singular reference to "the market."2" As Leslie points out, however,
predatory-pricing strategies can also succeed via higher prices in a different
market.n2 Indeed, that type of recoupment was likely happening on the facts
of Brooke Group, a possibility the Court failed to grasp.2's
Predatory low prices in one market may increase output in that market.
But recoupment via supracompetitive pricing in a different market harms
consumers in the different market. In other words, output of Product A may
increase, but consumers of Product B suffer the consequences. In Brooke
Group, for example, the defendants were setting low prices for generic
cigarettes in an effort to prop up long-run prices for branded cigarettes.214
Smokers of branded cigarettes suffered the consequences. This dynamic will
hold even if recoupment is less-than-total. Consumers in the second market
do not enjoy any benefits during the predation period, so their welfare is
unambiguously reduced by any supracompetitive pricing, no matter how
abortive or unsuccessful the overall predation strategy might be.
Consumers of the low-price product may benefit. But that does not
negate the harm. For one thing, effects generated by anticompetitive conduct
generally do not count in defendants' favor.215 Moreover, there is no

208. Id. at 22-24; see, e.g., C. Scott Hemphill, Note, The Role of Recoupment in PredatoryPricing
Analyses, 5 3 STAN. L. REV. 1581, 1591 (2001).
209.
210.

Brooke Grp. Ltd., 509 U.S. at 224.

211.

Id.

Id.

212.
Christopher R. Leslie, PredatoryPricingand Recoupment, 1 13 COLUM. L. REV. 1695, 1720
-31 (2013).
213.

Id. at 1723-25.

214.

Id.

Cf., e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST. & THE FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES 31 (201 o), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/20 o/o8/19/
215.

hmg-20o.pdf [https://perma.cc/2APC-7QQD] ("Other efficiencies, such as those relating to
research and development, are potentially substantial but ... may be the result of anticompetitive
output reductions.").
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practicable way to calculate whether "net" consumer welfare has increased.2
Nor, for that matter, whether "net" output has gone up or down. Suppose a
predatory-pricing scheme were to increase sales of apples by 50 units but
decrease sales of oranges by 40 units. One might be tempted to say that net
output has increased by 10 units, but the flaws in that conclusion are obvious.
The comparison is, both literally and figuratively, apples-to-oranges. The
values are incommensurable.2-7
6.

First-Degree Price Discrimination

Price discrimination can be defined roughly as "charging different prices
to different consumers for the identical item."21$ Price discrimination is
prominent in antitrust doctrine and discourse in two ways: (1) it is the subject
of an express congressional prohibition; and (2) it is often invoked as a
21
benign explanation for tying arrangements. 9 Congress explicitly prohibited
price discrimination in the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936, and federal
agencies once actively enforced the Act's various provisions.22o Today,
however, the orthodox position is that nearly all price discrimination is
beneficial or neutral. Federal antitrust agencies stopped enforcing Robinson

Williamson points to yet another potential way that predatory pricing can increase
216.
output while harming consumers, even absent any recoupment at all. Consumers may-and often
will-lack perfect information about the reason for and likely duration of a price cut. Oliver E.
Williamson, Predatory Pricing:A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 284, 290-91 (1977). If
buyers believe a relative price cut for a given product will last, they may incur fixed costs in
adapting to purchase (or purchase more of) that product. Id. The predatory prices will likely
cause output of the relevant product to increase. Yet predatory price-cutting is, by its nature,
temporary. Even if prices return only to a competitive level, consumers who incurred fixed costs
in reliance on the predatory price level can be harmed. Id. at 291.
217.

See generally Rebecca Haw Allensworth, The Commensurability Myth in Antitrust, 69 VAND.

L. REv. 1 (2016) (identifying incommensurability issues that can arise in a variety of antitrust
contexts). One might be tempted to convert the apples and oranges to dollars, then compare the
two-price-as-output, essentially. But the analysis is ultimately supposed to be concerned with
welfare. The outputist framework does not purport to actually quantify welfare effects. If apples
yield more welfare per unit than oranges (or vice versa), the analyst is left back where she started.
This is presumably why most outputist positions are self-limited to directional analysis of singleproduct effects-"increasing sales of Product A is good, decreasing sales of Product A is bad"
-rather

than comparisons involving different products.

Dennis W. Carlton & Mark Israel, Should Competition Policy Prohibit PriceDiscrimination?,
218.
in GLOB. COMPETITION REV. & COMPASS LEXECON, THE HANDBOOK OF COMPETITION EcONOMICS
to, 10 (2009), https://www.compasslexecon.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/o4/Price_
Discrimination.pdf [https://perma.cc/MM2Y-EAFX]. In economics, though not (always) in law,
it is more properly understood as differential price-to-cost ratios across different customers for
the same product.
219.
220.

See infra notes 223-25.
See infra note 224.
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-Patman.221 Some commentators also point to price discrimination as a
procompetitive justification for (some) tying arrangements.2 2 2
That shift was prompted not by new congressional guidance or judicial
authority, but by Chicagoan economic theory.223 In particular, it was partly an
outgrowth of the assumption that price discrimination is output-increasing,
and that output-increasing conduct is ipso facto efficient and desirable. That
assumption relies on supracompetitive price and output levels being the
alternative to price discrimination, an assumption that we will revisit shortly.224
For now, let us focus on a different issue.
A monopolist capable of perfect price discrimination is generally
assumed to face two options: (1) set a single price and reduce output to the
monopoly level; or (2) set a range of prices to different customers. The
equilibria yielded by these two options are depicted in Figure 2, below.
Figure 2.

Q.~ %QQ

Perfect monopoly is depicted on the left. Output (Q,,) is lower than it
would be under competitive conditions. Price (P,,) is higher. Consumer
surplus comprises the area within triangle abP,. Producer surplus comprises

221.
Since 2000, the sole agency action relating to price-discrimination litigation has been
an FTC amicus brief urging the Seventh Circuit to dismiss a private plaintiffs claim. See generally
Brief for the Federal Trade Comm'n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Defendants and Reversal,
Woodman's Food Mkt., Inc. v. Clorox Co., 833 F. 3 d 743 ( 7 th Cir. 2016) (No. 15-3001)
(supporting reversal of motion to dismiss in Robinson-Patman case).
222.
Grimes notes this school of thought, while going on to critique it. Statement of Warren
S. Grimes, Single-Firm Conduct & Antitrust L. Dep't of Just. & Fed. Trade Comm'n, Tying:
Requirements Ties, Efficiency and Innovation 5 (Nov. 20, 2006), https://www.justice.
gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/oI /04/21 9982.pdf [https://perma.cc/JY88-DUHK]
("Perfect price discrimination could result in higher output and, in this sense, be
procompetitive.").
223.

See DIRECTORATE FOR FIN. & ENTER. AFFS. COMPETITION COMM., ROUNDTABLE ON "PRICE

DISCRIMINATION":

NOTE

case-document/file/

9 79

BY THE

UNITED

211/download

STATES

6

(2016),

https://www.justice.gov/atr/

[https://perma.cc/UP88-PG6H] ("Though the Robinson-

Patman Act once was a mainstay of U.S. enforcement, a shift in emphasis based on economic
analysis resulted in a significant reduction in enforcement actions brought by the Agencies under
the Robinson-Patman Act.").
224.

See infra Section III.C.1.

&
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both square PmbdP and triangle Pace 225 Triangle bcd comprises a deadweight
loss. First-degree, or "perfect," price discrimination is depicted on the right.
Output (Q,) is higher than under monopoly conditions (Q,). The deadweight
loss disappears. But the producer has captured all of the consumer surplus
6
("welfare") within triangle ace.22 Even relative to monopoly price and output
levels-even if the orthodox benchmark were always correct, which it is
not227-such price discrimination reduces consumer welfare.228

7.

Cognitive Exploitation

By exploiting the nature of human cognition, firms can increase output
while reducing consumer welfare.229 By preventing such exploitation, firms
can simultaneously decrease output and increase welfare. One frequent example
of cognitive exploitation is over-selling and its corollary, overconsumption.230
A restraint of trade can limit overconsumption, thereby lowering output yet
leaving consumers better off. The U.S. Supreme Court recognized this as a
potentially valid procompetitive justification in its 1999 California Dental
opinion.23- As the Court explained, misleading advertisements by medical
professionals pose an especially high risk of harm in part because of
"[p]atients' attachments to particular professionals, the rationality of which is
difficult to assess .... "232 In other words, patients' trust in their healthcare

As Grimes explains, "Most, perhaps all, of the seller's increased revenue from a
225.
requirements tie will be in the form of a wealth transfer loss to buyers." Grimes, supra note 222.
See Einer Elhauge & Barry Nalebuff, The Welfare Effects of Metering Ties, 3 3 J.L. ECON.
226.
ORG. 68, 72 (2016) ("Perfect (or first-degree) price discrimination charges each buyer a price
for the tying product that precisely equals its valuation of that product. This clearly reduces
consumer welfare (by taking all consumer surplus) .... ").
See infra Section III.C.1.
Carlton and Israel emphasize that this result does not necessarily hold when
228.
competition is introduced. Carlton & Israel, supra note 218, at 13.
For example, one field study involved subjecting actual car buyers to decision fatigue by
229.
presenting them with a vast array of options, arranged sequentially so as to require serial decisionmaking. Jonathan Levav, Mark Heitmann, Andreas Herrmann & Sheena S. Iyengar, Order in Product
Customization Decisions: Evidence from Field Experiments, 118 J. POL. EcoN. 274, 282-96 (2010).
Buyers subjected to decision fatigue ultimately spent thousands of dollars more than non-fatigued
227.

buyers. Id. at 290, 293--95One example of overconsumption is addictive products. See generally, e.g., James Niels
230.
Rosenquist, Fiona M. Scott Morton & Samuel N. Weinstein, Addictive Technology and Its Implications
for Antitrust Enforcement, 1 oo N.C. L. REv. (forthcoming 2022) (explaining the overconsumption
of social media platforms stemming from their addictive qualities).
See Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 773 (1999) ("The existence of such
231.
significant challenges to informed decisionmaking [sic] by the customer for professional services
immediately suggests that advertising restrictions arguably protecting patients from misleading
or irrelevant advertising call for more than cursory treatment as obviously comparable to classic
horizontal agreements to limit output or price competition.").

232.

Id. at 772 (emphasis added).
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providers renders them especially susceptible to unscrupulous providers.233
Justice Souter, writing for the majority, reasoned that preventing exploitation
of that trust can be a cognizable procompetitive justification.234 This was so
despite the obvious likelihood that the challenged restraint decreased output.
Here, yet again, the Output-Welfare Fallacy fails to account for a leading
antitrust decision.235
These are not the only two types of cognitive exploitation that can be
relevant to antitrust analysis. Certain types of advertising (e.g., ads for
unhealthy food targeted at young children) are designed to increase output,
yet harm consumers.23 6 Harmful advertising is not a classic antitrust
violation,237 but agreements among rivals to limit harmful advertisements can
attract-and have attracted-antitrust scrutiny.23 8 In such cases, courts and
enforcers must decide whether the conduct should be condemned.239
Perhaps so, perhaps not-but analysis cannot defensibly proceed by simply
assuming that because the relevant conduct reduces output, it must harm
consumers.24 0

An information asymmetry is often at play in such relationships as well, but the Court's
233.
reference to "rationality" suggests a distinct issue relating to human cognition, one that can be
salient even in an information-rich environment. See id.

234.

Id. at 772-75.

235.
For another example of this dynamic, consider educational-accreditation organizations,
whose members are often themselves accredited colleges and universities. A decision to deny or
withdraw accreditation can reduce output of education. If output reductions really are the
supreme evil of antitrust, then such decisions would be uniformly suspect. But such conduct can
increase consumer welfare-indeed, the assumption that it does so provides the entire raisond'stre
of accreditation bodies. See, e.g., Accreditation in the United States, U.S. DEP'T EDUc., https://
www2.ed.gov/admins/finaid/accred/accreditation.html
[https://perma.cc/HGZ6-D 3 HT] (last
updated Dec. 6, 2021) ("The goal of accreditation is to ensure that institutions of higher
education meet acceptable levels of quality."). Courts have been reluctant to condemn denials of
accreditation, suggesting that-yet again--outputism fails to account for important parts of
actual antitrust doctrine. See generally, e.g., Mass. Sch. of L. at Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 846
F. Supp. 374 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (dismissing in part allegations by an unaccredited law school that
the ABA's accreditation standards were anticompetitive).

236. See Carlin Sheridan, United States: Food Advertising and the Rise of Childhood Obesity, YALE
GLOB. HEALTH REv. (Mar. 17, 2016), https://yaleglobalhealthreview.com/2016/03/17/unitedstates-food-advertising-and-the-rise-of-childhood-obesity [https://perma.cc/7C2Y-CJGQ]. For a
comprehensive revisiting of the FTC's ill-fated attempt to limit some ads to children in the 1970s,
see generally Luke Herrine, The Folklore of Unfairness, 96 N.Y.U. L. REv. 431 (2021) (detailing the
struggles of the FTC in defining "unfairness" in consumer markets).

237. But see Ramsi A. Woodcock, The Obsolescence ofAdvertising in the Information Age, 127 YALE
L.J. 2270, 2321 (2018) (arguing that persuasive advertising violates Sherman Act Section 2).
238. See, e.g., United States v. Nat'l Ass'n of Broads., 536 F. Supp. 149, 153 (D.D.C. 1982).
239.

See, e.g., Newman, supranote 157, at 506.

240.
In its 1999 CECED decision, the European Commission was receptive to a
procompetitive justification based on protecting consumers from making unwise purchasing
decisions. Commission Decision 2000/475, 2000 O.J. (L 187) 47 (EC). In that case, a group of
washing-machine manufacturers agreed to stop producing their cheapest, least-efficient machines.
Id. The primary justification was that higher-quality (but more expensive) machines yield enough
savings on electricity and water costs that consumers would actually be better off. Id.
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Customer and Consumer Coordination

Downstream coordination can decrease output, yet increase consumer
welfare. If a group of consumers gains buying power and demands lower
prices, standard economic theory predicts that output will fall.20 At the same
time, the standard assumption is that those consumers' welfare will increase
-or else they would not have entered into the agreement in the first place. A
consumer cartel will almost certainly increase consumer welfare.242 The
upshot is that, here again, output can decrease while consumer welfare
increases.
This is no mere peripheral issue. In every single labor market, for
example, employers are the consumers, just as they are the consumers of
other inputs like electricity, office spaces, and the like24S Thus, an agreement
among employers to depress wages will have the decoupled effects described
above. Output of a relevant product (labor) will go down, but the employerconsumers' welfare will presumably increase, or else they likely would not
2
have entered the agreement. 4 Should such agreements-and buyer-side
agreements more generally-be condemned as output-reducing or praised
for increasing consumer welfare?245 The Fallacy offers no ready answers. In
practice, antitrust has often condemned such conduct, sometimes
criminally.24 6 Yet at the very same time, courts have held that a horizontal

This is the inverse of the supplier coordination discussed in, e.g., John B. Kirkwood,
241.
Collusion to Control a Powerful Customer: Amazon, E-Books, and Antitrust Policy, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1,

25 (2014).
Jonathan M. Jacobson, Chair's Showcase: Rethinking Antitrust Econ. for the 21st
242.
Century, Another Take on the Relevant Welfare Standard for Antitrust 8-9 (Apr. 16, 2015),
https://www.wsgr.com/a/web/188/jacobson-o4 5 .pdf [https://perma.cc/88EC-FE5Z] (explaining
that a cartel of intermediate customers might indirectly yield less consumer welfare, but will not
necessarily do so).
See, e.g., Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), rev'd
243.
in part, vacated in part, 369 F.3 d 124 (2d Cir. 2004). Of course, employers usually also produce
something else-"widgets"-but widgets are not "reasonable substitutes" for inputs like electricity
or labor. Id. at 407. Consequently, they constitute different antitrust relevant markets. Effects
involving different markets are generally said to be irrelevant to partial-equilibrium analysis. See
John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of Antitrust: ProtectingConsumers, Not
IncreasingEfficiency, 8 4 NOTREDAMEL. REV. 191, 203 (2008).
See Gregory Day, Anticompetitive Employmen, 57 AM. Bus. LJ. 487, 491-93 (2020)
244.
(explaining labor cartels' benefit to consumers and thus why antitrust agencies are reluctant to
condemn them).
See, e.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 46, at 22. Professor Hovenkamp contends that, at least
245.
as a general matter, "both consumers and labor are harmed when output is anticompetitively
suppressed." Id. at 22. This is presumably a reference to consumers of some product other than
labor, however-more particularly, consumers of whatever it is that the relevant employer makes
and sells. Kirkwood and Lande use the example of natural gas pipelines merging, which eases the
tension-pipelines do not consume gas in the same way that a factory consumes inputs like labor
or electricity-but that is a fairly unusual context. Kirkwood & Lande, supra note 243, at 233-34
See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST. ANTITRUST Div. & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST
246.
GUIDANCE FOR HUMAN RESOURCE PROFESSIONALS 3-4 (2016), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/

*

IOWA LAW REVIEW

598

[Vol. 107:563

wage-fixing agreement may be justified by effects on consumers in a different
market.247 Here again, the supposed coherence and universality of outputist
antitrust are revealed to be a mirage.24 8
*

*

A broad array of strategic conduct can cause output and consumer
welfare to move in opposite directions. Thus, the Output-Welfare Fallacy rests
on a descriptively incorrect foundation; it does not reflect reality across a
variety of important settings. Moreover, courts have repeatedly condemned
output-enhancing conduct and blessed output-reducing conduct-directly
contrary to the prescriptions of outputism. Thus, the Fallacy also fails to
describe substantial portions of contemporary doctrine and practice. Even so,
the Fallacy continues to pervade antitrust commentary and recently reared its
head in a high-stakes Supreme Court opinion. We are left with a modern
antitrust paradox: output-reducing conduct is both the supreme evil of
antitrust and also frequently treated as procompetitive, while outputenhancing conduct is both antitrust's supreme good and frequently
condemned. The primary instrumental argument offered in favor of
outputism is that it has "rationalized" all of antitrust into a "coherent," unified
whole.249 But if left to continue its spread, the Output-Welfare Fallacy actually
threatens to render broad swaths of antitrust law contradictory.
B.

SIMULTANEOUS AND CONFLICTING OUTPUTAND WELFARE ETECTS

Whenever strategic conduct involves two or more products, it can
simultaneously put upward and downward pressure on output levels while also
simultaneously putting upward and downward pressure on welfare. This
"Push/Pull" effect poses an even more fundamental problem for outputism
-in cases where it is present, the entire Output-Welfare framework simply
collapses into incoherence. And again, these are not peripheral examples. To
90351 1/download [https://perma.cc/EXG2-LCXT]; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Just., Justice
Department Requires Six High Tech Companies to Stop Entering into Anticompetitive Employee
Solicitation Agreements (Sept. 24, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-departmentrequires-six-high-tech-companies-stop-entering-anticompetitive-employee [https://perma.cc/
E 9 QB-SAKK]; Peter C. Carstensen, Buyer Cartels VersusBuying Groups: LegalDistinctions,Competitive
Realities, and Antitrust Policy, i WM. & MARY BUS. L. REv. 1, 34 (2010).
247.
See, e.g., O'Bannon v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 802 F. 3 d 1049, 1072-73 (9th Cir.

2015).
248.
See Kirkwood & Lande, supra note 243, at 235 (noting that courts are somewhat divided
over how to analyze buy-side market power).
See, e.g., BORK, supra note 2, at 50 ("Antitrust policy cannot be made rational until we
to give a firm answer to one question: What is the point of the law .... Only when the
goals has been settled is it possible to frame a coherent body of substantive [antitrust]
Thomas B. Nachbar, Antitrust and the Politics of State Action, 6o WM. & MARY L. REV. 1395,
1433 (2019) (describing the "movement with its origins in the Chicago and Harvard Schools" as
"one that has generally led to more rationalized antitrust doctrine").
249.
are able
issue of
rules.");
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the contrary, the Push/Pull effect can be present in markets for online search,
social media, payment networks, college education, and student-athletes'
labor, all of which lie at the very center of today's antitrust enforcement efforts
and policy debates.

i.

"Push/Pull" Effects: Conduct Affecting Multiple Products

Conduct that affects multiple products can increase output of one
product while decreasing output of another. Simultaneously, the same
conduct can push welfare in opposite, conflicting directions. Effects on the
output(s) of different products are incommensurable-one cannot equate
2
output of apples with output of oranges. 50 And effects on the welfare of
consumers of different products are incommensurable and practicably
unmeasurable.
To illustrate these dual Push/Pull effects in a familiar context, consider
the facts of LorainJourna251In that case, a small-town newspaper controlled
the local markets for news (sold to readers) and advertisements (sold to
advertisers).252 To combat the nascent threat of a nearby radio station, the
dominant newspaper began refusing to sell advertising space to any customers
who bought advertising time from the radio station.253 Thus, the conduct
-which drew an antitrust challenge-was intended to reduce output of
advertisements.254 It presumably left local advertisers worse off, i.e., reduced
their welfare. At the same time, however, the conduct tended to create the
opposite effects as to readers. Readers, for the most part, do not like
advertisements.255 A reduction of ads tends to leave readers better off and
increase sales of news content.
See generally Allensworth, supranote 217 (addressing incommensurable outputs); see also
250.
Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("The draft is anticompetitive
in its effect on the market for players' services . . . . The draft is allegedly 'procompetitive' in its
effect on the playing field .... Because the draft's 'anticompetitive' and 'procompetitive' effects
are not comparable, it is impossible to 'net them out' in the usual rule-of-reason balancing."); In
re Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 958 F. 3 d 1239, 1269
-70 ( 9 th Cir. 2020) (Smith, J., concurring) ("Jurists faced with weighing the anticompetitive
effects in one market with the procompetitive effects in another cannot simply 'net them out'
mathematically." (quoting Smith, 593 F.2d at 1186)). On the problems inherent to crosscomparisons using price data, see supra note 217 and accompanying text.
251.

Lorain J. Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 145-49 (1951)

252.

Id. at 147.

253.

Id. at 148-49.
Id.
255. Cf' Kimberlee Morrison, Consumers Don't Like and Don't Trust DigitalAdvertising, ADWEEK
(May 5, 2017), https://www.adweek.com/digital/consumers-dont-like-and-dont-trust-digital254.

advertising-infographic [https://perma.cc/W275-GT5E] (stating that online consumers prefer
websites with less or no advertisements); Jon Gitlin, 74% of People Are Tired of Social Media Ads
-But They're Effective, SURVEYMONKEY, https://www.surveymonkey.com/curiosity/74-of-peopleare-tired-of-social-media-ads-but-theyre-effective [https://perma.cc/3 7 6P-2JSQ] ("Nearly 3 out
of every 4 users (74%) think there are too many ads. The number grows to 78% for adults 35+
years old.").
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As to such cases, the Output-Welfare Fallacy offers no useful guidance.
Again, the Fallacy states that the sole task of antitrust is to analyze whether
conduct has increased output (good) or restricted output (bad). Its
disjunctive framing neglects the fact that conduct can do both at the same
time. Proponents might try to argue that "net" output effects should govern
such cases, but it is impossible to compute net output effects as to two
different products. Suppose as a baseline that a newspaper sells ten papers
each week with five ads per paper. The newspaper engages in anticompetitive
conduct that results in two fewer ads per paper, but five additional papers
sold: Has total output decreased by five (ads) or increased by five (papers)?
Both are equally accurate statements. And it is impossible to calculate some
sort of net output effect. How many ads does it take to equal one paper, or
vice versa? The question is nonsensical. One might as well ask how many
apples it takes to equal an orange.25 6
Outputist analysis will tend to yield systematically incorrect outcomes or,
at best, squander scarce judicial resources on a fruitless inquiry. Suppose the
Supreme Court had fallen for the Output-Welfare Fallacy in Lorainjournal. It
would have required the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's conduct
reduced output. Demanding proof of a net output reduction-an
impossibility-would have meant dismissing a meritorious case, allowing
harmful conduct to go unremedied. Alternatively, the Court could have
accepted proof of reduced output of advertisements, then shifted the burden
to the defendant to prove that its conduct actually increased output. The
defendant likely could have done so via proof that printing fewer ads made its
papers more attractive to readers. The Court would have been left right where
it started, having wasted substantial judicial and litigant resources on an
analytical snipe hunt. Fortunately, the Lorain Journal Court avoided this
trap.25 7 When that case was decided in 1951, outputism had not yet begun to
take hold. Not all subsequent courts have fared so well.258
As this example illustrates, outputism can force judges and enforcers to
ask the wrong questions. In cases like these, both the output reduction and
the demand increase resulted from anticompetitive conduct. No trade-off is
required, for there is nothing to "trade off."259

As to the problems inherent in any attempt to do so by using price data, see supra note
accompanying text. For examples ofjudges identifying the impossibility of the task, see
supra note 250 and accompanying text.
256.

168 and

257.
See LorainfJ, 342 U.S. at 150 (recognizing traits of a monopoly without undertaking this
circular analysis).

258.

See infra Section IVA (discussing the AmEx Court's errors).

259.
Cf Easterbrook, supra note 196, at 155-56 (making the inverse point that where a
reduction in intrabrand competition spurs interbrand competition, both effects are in some
sense "procompetitive," such that analysts need not try to balance the incommensurable values).
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Application: Online Search, Social Media, and More

Push/Pull effects are of much more than academic interest. This
dynamic can be present in a wide variety of multiproduct settings, and it will
always be present in barter markets. Online search, social networks, college
education and student-athlete labor, a variety of broadcast and digital
content-all of these are commonly exchanged via barter transactions.26o
They are also at the center of high-profile contemporary antitrust litigation
and policy debates.
Attention markets, for example, commonly involve barter exchanges.
Humans produce attention, which we can trade to intermediaries in exchange
for products like online search and social media, broadcast content, mapping
6
applications, email services, news, entertainment, and more.2 ' The exchange
takes the form of product-for-product instead of the more familiar money-forproduct. As to general search services, for example, users trade their attention
(a product) to firms like Google.26 2 In exchange, firms deliver search results
(another product) to users.2 63 The firms then convert the attention to cash by
selling it to advertisers, who ultimately consume it.264
Because attention markets necessarily involve two products, they can and
often will exhibit Push/Pull effects. Suppose all three general-search
providers were to agree with one another to carry fewer advertisements. The
agreement would obviously reduce output vis-a-vis advertisers, leaving them
worse off. Yet fewer digital advertisements tends to yield both more users and
more usage by current users.2 65 Internet users, for the most part, do not like
advertisements.2 66 Thus, the agreement would simultaneously tend to
increase output of search results and leave users better off. Again, the OutputWelfare Fallacy offers no guidance on how to trade off simultaneous upward
and downward output effects and simultaneous upward and downward
welfare effects.
For another example, consider college education and student-athlete
labor. Many student-athletes trade their labor and licensing rights to colleges

See generally John M. Newman, The Myth of Free, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 513 (2018)
260.
(debunking the popular misconception that these products are "free").
See, e.g., John M. Newman, Antitrust in Zero-Price Markets: Foundations, 164 U. PA. L. REv.
261.

149, 151-53 (2015).
262. See, e.g., Complaint at 9-10, United States v. Google LLC, No. 1:2o-cv-o3010 (D.D.C.
Oct. 20, 2020).

263.

Id.

SeeJohn M. Newman, Antitrust in Attention Markets: Definition, Power, Harm 21-22 (Univ.
264.
Mia. Legal Stud., Working Paper No. 3745839, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.

cfm?abstract-id= 3 745839 [https://perma.cc/D6TJ-7CEP].

265. Christopher Hendrickson, Less Is More: How FewerAds Can Make You More Money, ADWEEK
(Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.adweek.com/media/fewer-ads-means-more-money [https://
perma.cc/ 3 AH8-VLEK] ("[P]oor user experiences brought about by ads can turn away users....").
266.

See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
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and universities.2 6 7 In exchange, the schools offer college education, housing,
and food.2 68 Student-athletes produce labor and licensing rights, which
schools consume as one of the inputs into their production of college athletic
events (much like schools consume electricity to power stadium lights, for
example).2 69 At the same time, schools produce college education, which is
consumed by student-athletes270 A group of schools has agreed to fix wages
paid to student-athletes at zero-these are the "amateurism" rules that were
at issue in O'Bannon v. NCAA217 and NCAA v. Alston.272 That type of agreement
leaves some consumers of one product (college education) worse off. But it
also leaves consumers of two different products (labor and licensing rights)
better off. Meanwhile, effects on output of college education are
indeterminate. It will tend to decrease the output of labor and licensing
rights. Finally, the challenged restraint might also increase output of yet
another product: live and televised college sports. 273 To the extent it increases
viewer appreciation of college sports (a contested issue), it would also tend to
benefit that group of consumers.
For those keeping score, then, the restraint would simultaneously have
indeterminate effects on output of one product, reduce output of two
different products, and potentially increase output of a fourth product. It
would also benefit consumers of two products, harm consumers of a third
product, and possibly benefit consumers of a fourth product. Yet again,
outputism simply collapses. Even if output of each of these products could be
quantified, the conflicting results would yield no meaningful policy
prescriptions.
Outputism offers no affirmative value to antitrust analysis of conduct
involving barter markets. Its failure in this regard alone might well be
disqualifying. These markets lie at the very core of antitrust policy and
practice. United States v. Google LLC, filed in October 2020, is the highest
profile Sherman Act Section 2 case brought by the Justice Department in

267.

See, e.g., O'Bannon v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 7 F. Supp.

3

d 955, 973 (N.D. Cal.

2014), rev'd in part on other grounds, 8o2 F. 3 d 1049 ( 9 th Cir. 2015) ("In the complex exchange
[t]he recruit
represented by a recruit's decision to attend and play for a particular school, ...
provides his athletic performance and the use of his name, image, and likeness.").
Id. ("[T]he school provides tuition, room and board, fees, and book expenses .... ").
See id. at 996 ("[S]chools ... compete ... as sellers in the college education market or
consumers in the market for recruits' athletic services and licensing rights."); Banks v. Nat'l
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 9 7 7 F.2d 1o81, 1098 ( 7 th Cir. 1992) (Flaum,J., concurring in part and
certainly are consumers in the
dissenting in part) ("[P]eople who watch college football ...
college football product market, but the market at issue here is the college football labor market,
and the NCAA member colleges are consumers in that market.").
268.

269.

271.

O'Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3 d at 973.
O'Bannon v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 802 F.3 d 1049, 1053 (9 th Cir. 2015).

272.

Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2152 (2021).

273.

See O'Bannon, 802 F.3 d at 1061-62.

270.
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decades274 Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Facebook, Inc. and New York v. Facebook, Inc.
followed closely on its heels.275 The U.S. Supreme Court recently issued a
narrow ruling in NCAA v. Alston, and litigation appears likely to continue.276
If outputism cannot speak to these matters-and it cannot-one is left to
wonder how it could possibly form the backbone of antitrust.
C.

HARM ABSEw OUTPUTEFFECTS

Multiple types of conduct can reduce consumer welfare without affecting
output levels. Price discrimination is one such category.277 The orthodox
position incorrectly assumes that the alternative to price discrimination is
always supracompetitive price and output levels. But by preventing
inframarginal customers from protecting marginal customers, price
discrimination can reduce welfare without reducing output. The second
category comprises conduct affecting customers whose demand is inelastic
below a walkaway price (or sellers whose supply is inelastic above a walkaway
price).278 Here again, output can diverge from welfare.
According to outputist logic, none of this conduct should violate the
antitrust laws, because none of it reduces output. Yet, as the following
discussion makes clear, these types of conduct actually can constitute
violations in the real world. In fact, some of them are viewed as per se illegal,
and even criminal. Thus, yet again, the Output-Welfare Fallacy fails to reflect
important portions of contemporary antitrust doctrine and practice.
1.

Price Discrimination with Marginal Customers

Many contemporary commentators view price discrimination as benign,
even desirable. That position stems from the economic assumption that price
discrimination is output-increasing, and that output-increasing conduct is ipso
facto efficient. Posner's view is representative: "There is no need to worry
[P]rice discrimination brings the
about price discrimination . ...
monopolist's output closer to that of a competitive market and reduces the
misallocative effects of monopoly."279 Both the DOJ and the FTC have made
similar statements.28o This assumes that without the ability to price

274.

See Complaint at 2-7, United States v. Google LLC, No.

1:20-cv-o3010

(D.D.C. Oct. 20,

2020).

275. Complaint at 50-51, Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Facebook, Inc., No. 1:20-cv-o 3 5 9 o-JEB
(D.D.C. Jan. 13, 2021); Complaint at 6, New York v. Facebook, Inc., No. 1:20-cv-0 3 5 8 9 -JEB
(D.D.C. Dec. 9, 2020).
Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2 165-66.
276.
See infra Section III.C.1.
277.
See infra Section III.C.2.
Richard A. Posner, lhe Chicago School ofAntitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. Rev. 925,926 (1979).
279.
DIRECTORATE FOR FIN. & ENTER. AFFS. COMPETITION COMM., PERSONALIZED PRICING IN
280.
THE DIGITALERA-NOTE BYTHEUNITED STATES4 (Nov. 21, 2018), https://one.oecd.org/document/
278.
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discriminate, a monopolist will restrict output and raise price across-theboard. In other words, the prevailing view assumes that supracompetitive
price and output levels are the alternative to price discrimination.
But the alternative to price discrimination is often not supracompetitive
price and output levels. The key insight is that demand is always
heterogeneous, at least in every market that might plausibly involve price
discrimination. Suppose there are two groups of buyers: a "marginal" lowdemand group and an "inframarginal" high-demand group. Absent price
discrimination, a powerful seller faces two options: set a high price and lose
the marginal group, or set a lower price and sell to both groups.28' Whenever
the marginal customer group is substantial enough, the seller will choose the
lower price to avoid losing too many sales.282 In this way, low-demand
customers can protect more vulnerable high-demand customers. Price and
output will not reach monopoly levels. Prices are lower, output is higher, and
consumers are better off. The alternative to price discrimination can be
competitive-like conditions, rather than monopolistic ones.2 83
Price discrimination prevents marginal consumers from protecting
inframarginal customers. Thus, price discrimination does not necessarily
increase output, contra the orthodox assumption. Instead, it may leave output
levels unaffected, while transferring surplus ("welfare") away from consumers.
Real-world empirical research supports this intuition.284 The dynamic is
depicted in Figure 3, below.

DAF/COMP/WD(2018)140/en/pdf

[https://perma.cc/95FM-8LZG]

("[F]irst-degree

price

discrimination unambiguously increases total welfare.... [A] firm engaging in first-degree price
discrimination expands output and eliminates the deadweight loss associated with market power.").
281.
See, e.g., SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 843 (using the example of a manufacturer that
sells to high-end boutiques and discount stores).
282.
Cf United States v. Engelhard Corp., 126 F. 3 d 1302, 1306 (1 ith Cir. 1997) ("[I]t is
possible for only a few customers who switch to alternatives to make the price increase
unprofitable, thereby protecting a larger number of customers who would have acquiesced in

higher ...

prices.").

283.
Bork's very earliest work recognized that price discrimination will not always increase
output, though he thought that output increases "seem[] more likely." Bork, supra note 61, at
198.
284.
Shepard examined price discrimination by gas stations offering both self-service and
full-service gasoline. See generally Andrea Shepard, PriceDiscriminationand Retail Configuration, 99
J. POL. ECON. 30 (1991) (exploring price discrimination in gas stations). Such stations were able
to price discriminate, unlike stations offering only one or the other. Id. at 42. Crucially, she found
that prices for full-service gas were $o.og to $o.1 1 higher at price-discriminating stations than at
full-service stations unable to discriminate. Id. at 44-45. This is consistent with marginal
customers protecting inframarginal ones at the non-discriminating stations.
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Figure 3.

Absent price discrimination, the marginal customers (Pcbc) may be able
to protect the inframarginal customers (abP,) from paying higher prices. As a
8
result, abP, represents consumer surplus.2 5 Output is Qc, and price is P,. But
notice what happens when price discrimination is introduced, as on the right.
Marginal customers can no longer protect inframarginal ones. All of the
consumer welfare vanishes, although the output level (Qs) has not changed.
Price discrimination has substantially reduced consumer welfare without a
corresponding output reduction.
This is relevant not only to price-discrimination law itself, but also to the
analysis of tying arrangements and (to a somewhat lesser extent) vertical
mergers. In a model with heterogeneous demand, for example, Professors
Erik Hovenkamp and Herbert Hovenkamp suggest that "metering" ties
86
benefit low-demand customers.2 The intuition is that such customers would
not purchase the tying good if it were provided separately, on the assumption
that the separate-provision price will be higher than the tying-condition
price.287 But if the low-demand customer group is substantial enough to
protect other customers, the price of the tying good will be driven lower,
perhaps even to cost.2 88 As a result, Hovenkamp and Hovenkamp's analysis
necessarily holds only when the seller offers the tying good at below-cost
prices-a practice that case law suggests is rare.289 Tying arrangements that
facilitate price discrimination are likely more harmful than the prevailing view
290
suggests.
For readability, the marginal-cost curve is not explicitly labeled; it is line cb.
Erik Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovenkamp, TyingArrangements, in THlE OXFORD HANDBOOK
286.
OF INTERNATIONALANTITRUSTECONOMICS 329, 335-36 (Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2015).
285.

287.

Id.

288. See Salop & Stiglitz, supra note 135, at 494 ("[I]f there are enough informed agents, the
market price will settle down to the perfectly competitive price."). Salop and Stiglitz focus on
differential search costs, but their results are generalizable to heterogenous preferences. Id. at 493.
See Grimes, supra note 222 ("[T]his gain will occur only if the seller lower's the price of
289.
the tying product, something that the case law suggests may not occur at all.").
Hilton's foundational work similarly appears to assume the relevant benchmark for
290.
comparison is monopoly price levels. See George W. Hilton, Tying Sales and Full-Line Forcing, 81
WEITWIRTSCHAFFLICHEs ARC~i-v 265, 270 (1958)

("[If] tying arrangements are prohibited,
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Inelastic Demand/Supply Below/Above a Walkaway Price

Conduct can also be harmful without reducing output when demand (or
supply) is inelastic below (or above) a walkaway price. Suppose, for example,
a city needs one additional downtown parking garage. The city calculates the
net present value of benefits to its citizens at $10 million over the lifespan of
the garage. Thus, the city is willing to spend up to $io million-its walkaway
price-on the project. Under competitive conditions, the garage would cost
the city $8.5 million to complete.29, But suppose local general contractors
agree to rig bids, such that the lowest bid submitted is $io million.292 The city,
none the wiser, accepts the bid, and the garage is built. The contractors'
conduct did not affect output, yet it left the buyer $1.5 million poorer. 293
In such situations, outputist logic would dictate finding that no violation
has occurred. But in the real world, courts often do not require plaintiffs to
prove output effects.294 The challenged conduct is generally treated as per se
illegal, and even criminal. Consider, for example, the defendants in Seville
Industrial Machinery, who "agreed ... not to bid against one another" at a
government bankruptcy auction.295
All of the bankrupt firm's assets were sold at the rigged auction, albeit at
substantially lower prices than would have been reached in a competitive
auction.29 6 Despite the lack of any output effect, the conspirators were
criminally indicted, and the court treated their conduct as per se illegal.297
Similarly, in BensingerCo., a group of defendants were criminally charged after
conspiring to fix the price of a commercial refrigerator.29 8 After receiving the
(fixed) bids, the targeted customer declined to accept any of them and

... the prohibition is equivalent to requiring a monopolist to desist from discriminating and to
begin charging a single monopoly price."). The present analysis also underscores that Posner was
wrong to declare that the introduction of price discrimination always increases allocative
efficiency. See Posner, supranote 279, at 926. There is no deadweight loss under either alternative
in Figure 3.

291.

See Laura Madrigal, How Much Does It Cost to Build a Parking Garage?, FIXR (Aug. 26,
[https://perma.cc/gNSA-7 5 JE].

2021), https://www.fixr.com/costs/build-parking-garage

292.

Bid-rigging is quite common, even in larger cities. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep't of

Just., Commercial Flooring Contractor Agrees to Plead Guilty to Bid Rigging (Aug. 27, 2020),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/commercial-flooring-contractor-agrees-plead-guilty-bid-rigging

[https://perma.cc/X8J-Y7XC] (describing a nearly decade-long bid-rigging conspiracy in Chicago).
293.
One might object that the city now has less to spend on other projects, but the city may
not need any other projects completed in the near term.
294.
See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224-25 n.59 (1940) ("It
is the '... restraint of trade . . .' which § 1 of the Act strikes down, whether the concerted activity
be wholly nascent or abortive on the one hand, or successful on the other.").

295.

United States v. Seville Indus. Mach. Corp., 696 F. Supp. 986, 988 (D.N.J. 1988).

Id. Following the public auction, the defendants held a private auction that generated
296.
more than $75,000 more in revenue than had the (rigged) public auction. Id.

297.
298.

Id. at 989-go.
United States v. Bensinger Co., 43o F.2d 584, 587 (8th Cir. 1970), superseded by FED. R.

EvID. 104.
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subsequently bought the refrigerator from a non-conspirator; thus, output
was not affected. Nonetheless, the bid-riggers' conduct was treated as per se
illegal and criminal.299 Yet again, the Output-Welfare Fallacy fails to describe
actual case law.soo
*

*

In sum, a vast amount of marketplace activity can have decoupled or
ambiguous output and welfare effects. Strategic conduct can increase output
while reducing welfare. The inverse is also true: firms acting alone or in
concert can reduce output in order to increase welfare. Conduct can
simultaneously push output in conflicting directions and welfare in
conflicting directions. Some conduct has no effect on output, but harms
welfare. As all of this makes clear, output and welfare are not interchangeable.
Output is not a reliable stand-in for welfare. The Output-Welfare Fallacy is
just that, a fallacy.
In practice, the Output-Welfare Fallacy would yield bizarre outcomes in
some cases, systematically biased outcomes in others, and is nonsensical and
unworkable in still others. Under outputist logic, the very same conduct can
be both the supreme good and the supreme evil of antitrust-a modern
antitrust paradox. Where the Fallacy is deployed, it causes massive societal
harm. Fortunately, it has not yet taken hold of the entire antitrust enterprise.
Its incomplete victory will make it easier to excise from antitrust doctrine,
discourse, and practice.
IV. ESCAPING THE NEw ANTITRUST PARADOX

Recognizing the Output-Welfare Fallacy as such offers immense payoffs.
First, harmful outputist decisions-most pressingly the Supreme Court's 2o18
AmEx opinion-warrant swift overruling, whether judicially or via legislation.30
At the very least, it can quietly be relegated to the dustbin of history, as often
happens to especially shoddy antitrust opinions.302 Second, evolving beyond
outputism allows a much-needed correction of antitrust law's substantive
burdens of proof. Analysis of market power, anticompetitive effects, and
procompetitive justifications can all be improved considerably.

299.

Id. at 5 89.

Although these examples involve the application of the per se rule, under which proof
3oo.
of actual marketplace effects is generally not required, harm without output effects can also occur
in the context of vertical restraints or unilateral exclusionary conduct. In such cases, proof of
effects is generally required.
301.

See H. SUBCOMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. & ADMIN. L. OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
(2020).
INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGIT. MKTS

I i 6TH CONG.,

398-99

302. Again, it may be worth recalling that two of Justice Thomas's previous forays into
antitrust are regarded by at least some observers as especially problematic. See Baker, supra note
123, at 365-67 (discussing Baker lghes); see also Sagers, supra note 123, at 393 (discussing Dagher).
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BURYING AMEX: BAD LA w, WORSE ECONOMICS

The Output-Welfare Fallacy reached its apex in the Supreme Court's
recent AmEx opinion. AmEx began as a suit by the United States against the
three largest credit-card companies, Visa, AmEx, and MasterCard. The
government sought to enjoin "anti-steering" rules contractually imposed by
these networks on all card-accepting merchants.303 The rules forbid
merchants from presenting any network in a differentiated way to customers.
Merchants cannot offer discounts for using a particular brand of card, tell
customers "[w]e prefer" a certain card, or inform customers of the costs
associated with each brand.304 Visa and MasterCard quickly settled, but
AmEx-which generally charged the highest merchant fees-fought to keep
its rules in place.305
At trial, the Antitrust Division proved that AmEx's no-steering rules had
stifled competition and increased card-acceptance prices across all
networks.o6 When Discover tried to compete by lowering prices to merchants,
for example, AmEx's rules prevented those merchants from encouraging
their customers to pay with Discover's less-expensive cards.3s7 Discover
predictably abandoned its efforts to compete and instead raised cardacceptance fees-which it "was able to [do] with ... impunity," again due to
AmEx's restraints.3o 8 Facing higher across-the-board acceptance costs,
merchants passed along some of those costs to consumers "in the form of
higher [across-the-board] retail prices."309 In other words, AmEx's restraints
increase the cost of nearly every good and service sold to consumers in the
United States.3>0
Despite abundant evidence of harm in the trial record, a divided Court
declared that the government had failed to carry its burden. Justice Thomas,
writing for the majority, began by quoting the leading treatise for the
proposition that "[m]arket power is the ability to raise price profitably by
restricting output."3" (Thomas added the emphasis.) The majority opinion
begrudgingly admitted that AmEx's restraints had caused higher prices.32

303.
304.

United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp.
Id. at 16 5

305.

Id.

3d

143, 163-65 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).

at 150.

3o6.

Id. at 215.
307.
Id. at 216.
308. Id.
309. Id.
Id.
310.
311.
Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2288 (2018) (quoting IX AREEDA
HOVENKAMP, sufra note 4, 1 5.01). Thomas also cited Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs.,
Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 464 (1992). But Kodak had not defined "market power" quite so narrowly; it
quoted earlier statements to the effect that market power is "the ability of a single seller to raise
price and restrict output." Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S. at 464 (citation omitted).
312.

Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2289.
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Nonetheless, credit-card usage-i.e., output-had increased over the relevant
time period.313 As a result, the Court held for the defendant.3'4 Justice
Thomas' opinion also endorsed "consumer welfare" as antitrust's goal.3's
Thus, for the first time in a Supreme Court decision, the conflation of output
6
with welfare-the Output-Welfare Fallacy-was on clear display.3'
Not only did AmEx embrace the Output-Welfare Fallacy, it did so in
exactly the type of case where output and welfare can and will diverge. The
facts implicated at least three of the categories discussed above: the challenged
restraints: (i) maintained an information asymmetry, (2) externalized costs; and
(3) caused conflicting output effects and simultaneously caused conflicting
welfare effects, an example of the Push/Pull dynamic that can arise in multiproduct settings.3'7
8
First, AmEx's merchant restraints maintained an information asymmetry.3
Credit-card networks and merchants know how much it costs to accept credit
cards, but AmEx's contractual restrictions prevented merchants from
communicating that information to their customers.3'9 Such restraints can
increase output, yet reduce welfare.320 By keeping cardholders in the dark
about acceptance costs, AmEx's restraints propped up demand for its
products. Indeed, AmEx conceded that if its cardholders were given accurate
information about acceptance costs, at least some of them would decrease
their usage of AmEx cards or switch to a different network.S2' Some would

313.

Id. at 2288 ("The output of credit-card transactions grew dramatically from 2008 to

2013, increasing 30%.").

Id. at 2290.
This was admittedly an off-handed endorsement, coming as it did in a parenthetical
315.
characterization of the Court's 2007 Leegin decision: "(recognizing that vertical restraints can ...
enhance competition and consumer welfare)." Id. at 2289-go (quoting Leegin Creative Leather
Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007)). More squarely, Thomas also stated that
"[t]he goal [of the rule of reason] is to 'distinguis[h] between restraints with anticompetitive
effect that are harmful to the consumer and restrains stimulating competition that are in the
consumer's best interest.'" Id. at 2284 (second alteration in original) (quoting Leegin, 551 U.S.
at 886). The author thanks Jack Kirkwood for flagging the latter reference.
Am. Express Co., 1 3 8 S. Ct. at 2302 (Breyer,J., dissenting) ("[T]he majority retreats to saying
316.
that even net price increases do not matter after all, absent a showing of lower output ... .").
314.

317.

See supraSection III.B.

318.

United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d

143, 209

(E.D.N.Y. 2015 ). The district

court found that the AmEx-enforced information asymmetry impacted demand, i.e., output,
though it did not identify the direction of the effects. Id. As the Supreme Court did not hold this
finding of fact to be an abuse of discretion on appeal, it presumably stands as part of the record
in the case. See Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2288-89 (majority opinion).
Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3 d at 165 ("The [challenged restraints] disable merchants
319.
[p]osting a sign that discloses the merchant's actual cost of accepting each network's
from ...
cards or that compares the relative costs of acceptance across card brands, even if such
information is accurate and truthful .... ").
See supra Section III.A.
This might alternatively be thought of as maintaining an information "imperfection."
Joseph E. Stiglitz, Information and the Change in Paradigmin Economics, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 460, 473
320.
321.
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likely switch to less costly forms of payment, like debit cards. Per standard
assumptions regarding revealed preferences, that output reduction would
have increased, not decreased, consumer welfare. Thus, the lack of a
demonstrable output reduction did not undercut the plaintiffs' case-if
anything, the fact that credit-card usage increased during the relevant time
period buttressed the theory of harm.
Second, AmEx's challenged restraints allowed both it and its cardholders
to externalize costs.3 2 2 This can harm consumers writ large; it can also harm
consumers of the relevant product.323 By stifling competition among card
networks, the restraints increase costs for merchants. Yet AmEx's restraints
prevent merchants from passing the additional costs on to the cardholders
who trigger them. As a result, merchants are forced to raise prices to all of
their customers, including those who pay with cash, checks, money orders,
and food stamps.324 AmEx's merchant restraints allow it to stimulate demand
for its product by externalizing the costs of credit-card rewards onto other,
more vulnerable segments of society.
Moreover, AmEx's restraints effectively turn credit cards into a
"combatant good."325 Faced with the choice between paying higher retail
prices without receiving any rewards and paying higher prices while receiving
some rewards, each individual consumer is incentivized to "defect" and begin
using credit cards. But AmEx does not pass all of its supracompetitive profits
to cardholders as rewards. Thus, the rewards paid out will not necessarily fully
offset the retail price increases-evenfor cardholders.Especially in sectors where
fewer non-cardholders are available to subsidize rewards points, even
cardholders can suffer.32 6 Again, the lack of a demonstrable output reduction
in AmEx did not signal that the restraints were procompetitive-to the
contrary, it was perfectly consistent with the theory of harm.
Third, the challenged restraints are of a type that will simultaneously push
output higher and lower-the Push/Pull Effect. Credit-card networks offer
different services to merchants and cardholders, such that the two are not
economic substitutes. A merchant faced with higher interchange fees cannot
"substitute" to carrying a credit card, nor can a cardholder paying high
interest rates "substitute" to accepting credit-card payments.3 2 7 AmEx's
(2002) ("[I]t [is] not just information asymmetries, but information imperfections
generally, that [a]re relevant.").

more

322.
Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3 d at 209 ("[W]ith the [challenged restraints] in place,
customers do not internalize the full cost of their payment choice .... ").
323.

See supraSection IIA.

324.

See supra Section IILA.

325.

See Nagler, supra note 167, at 396-97.

326.
Different merchants encounter different mixes of payment methods. Most online
merchants, for example, transact almost exclusively via credit and debit networks.
327.
Substitutability-or lack thereof-has always been how antitrust analysis identifies
separate products. Thus, at least according to most serious observers, the facts of AmEx involved
two unique products. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Platforms and the Rule of Reason: The American
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restraints increased the price of card-acceptance services for merchants.328
This, in turn, put downward pressure on output of those services. Thus, for
example, a massive program of merchant price increases caused some
merchants to stop accepting AmEx cards.329 Yet the restraints also allowed
AmEx to pass some-though not all-of its supracompetitive profits on to its
cardholders as rewards points. By increasing the incentive to pay with credit
cards, the restraints put upward pressure on output of cardholder services.330
Nonetheless, Justice Thomas's opinion required the plaintiffs to prove
that AmEx's restraints caused a net output reduction.331 But the Push/Pull
Effect meant that overall output effects were necessarily indeterminate as to
the core question of harm.332 And, given that the challenged restraints
maintained an information asymmetry and facilitated a negative externality,
the fact that credit-card usage had been increasing actually supported-or was
at least consistent with-the plaintiffs' theory of harm.
AmEx is a shoddy opinion. Unless and until it is overruled, it will continue
to have harmful consequences for the real-world individuals who bear the
brunt of the challenged conduct. In the interim, the antitrust enterprise can
safely disregard it as bad law, based on bad economics. Antitrust, more so than
most other areas of law, is willing to treat especially bad judicial opinions as
lacking any force.333 AmEx should meet a similar fate.
This dark cloud may carry a silver lining. AmEx may continue to be useful
as a negative illustration. The majority opinion's double mistake makes it a
perfect illustration of why the Output-Welfare Fallacy should be rejected. Not
only did Thomas assume that output is the exclusive criterion for analyzing
welfare effects, he did so in a case that actually exhibited notjust one, but three
separate factors that can cause output to diverge from welfare. From the
perspective of those who endorse outputism, Thomas and his brethren could
hardly have picked a worse case in which to formally embrace it. The du Pont

Express Case, 2019 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 35, 56-57 (2019); see also Kirkwood, supra note 36, at
1809-12. Justice Thomas's majority opinion declared instead that AmEx sells a single product
called "transactions." Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2287 (2o18). Under this view,
AmEx sells "transactions" to merchants and also sells the same "transactions" to cardholders. See
id. One obvious and fatal flaw in that line of reasoning is that "transactions" are not an actual
product that is sold to anyone.

328.

United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp.

3 d 143,

216 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).

Id. at 196-97 ("[A] mong . . millions of small merchants .. . ,American Express appears
329.
to have concluded that Value Recapture was profitable on the whole, even though the network
observed higher rates of cancellation and card suppression .... ").
See supra note 168-70 and accompanying text (describing the combatant good effect).
330.
Am. Express Co., 1 3 8 S. Ct. at 229o.
Katz & Melamed, supra note 1 28, at 2097-98 ("It is unclear whether on balance the no332.
steering provisions increase or decrease output.").
See generally, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust Antitextualism, 96 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1205
333.
(2021) (discussing the atypical judicial relationship with antitrust law); Sanjukta Paul, Recovering
the Moral Economy Foundationsof the Sherman Act, 131 YALE L.J. 175 (2021) (discussing that "[the
Sherman Act] has been understood as an effective "blank check" to federal courts").
331.
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case of an earlier era was flawed, but it is still used in classrooms to illustrate
its own mistake-the (in)famous "Cellophane Fallacy."334 AmEx can similarly
be used as a teaching tool to exemplify its own error-the "AmEx Fallacy."
B.

RLVISING BURDENS OFPROOF

The Output-Welfare Fallacy makes for misguided antitrust policy.
Doctrinally, it manifests via burdens of proof. Plaintiffs' initial burden often
entails proving that the defendant(s) had "market power"-sometimes
defined as the power to "reduce output."335 Where plaintiffs must
demonstrate anticompetitive effects, the Fallacy would require proof that the
challenged conduct tended to reduce marketwide output.33 6 If an antitrust
plaintiff is able to make out a primafacie case, the burden generally shifts to
defendants to offer a procompetitive justification.337 In such cases, the Fallacy
would force defendants to prove that their conduct actually increased output.
But outputist prescriptions rest on a flawed foundation. The following
discussion identifies superior alternatives.
1.

Market Power as Control

It is bad policy to define "market power" narrowly as the power to "reduce
output."33 8 Instead, "market power" can more usefully be defined as the power
to "control" a relevant aspect of marketplace competition.339 This more flexible
definition avoids the inherent illogic of outputism; it will also allow judges to
avoid wasting scarce judicial resources and improve decisional outcomes.
The outputist framing assumes that reducing output is the only way to
exercise market power, or, at the very least, that an exercise of market power

334. See generally United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956)
(finding no illegal cellophane monopoly); see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Response: Markets in IP
and Antitrust, 1 oo GEO. L.J. 2133, 2146 n.6o (2012).
335.

See infra notes 339-46 and accompanying text.

See supra Section IV.A and note 332.
See Newman, supra note 157, at 506-09 (explaining the burden-shifting framework that
characterizes most of modern antitrust analysis).
336.

337.

For representative examples, seeBrief for Antitrust L. & Econ. Scholars as Amicus Curiae
338.
Supporting of Respondents, supra note 6, at 40 ("[M]arket power is defined as the ability to
restrict market-wide output. . . ."); Ball Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325,
1335 ( 7 th Cir. 1986) ("Market power comes from the ability to cut back the market's total output
.... "); see also Geneva Pharms. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Lab'ies Inc., 386 F. 3 d 485, 500 (2d Cir. 2004)
(rejecting evidence that defendant had lowered prices in response to entry as "ambiguous" absent
proof of an output restriction).

339.

United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966) (emphasis added). This

definition offers the added historical advantage of having been endorsed by the U.S. Supreme
Court on multiple occasions. See, e.g., id. ("[W]e define[] monopoly power as 'the power to
control prices or exclude competition."') (quoting F.]. du Pont, 351 U.S. at 391); see also, e.g.,
United States v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 399 F.3 d 181, 187 ( 3 d Cir. 2005) ("[M]onopoly power ...
has been defined as the ability 'to control prices or exclude competition.'" (quoting Grinnell, 384

U.S. at

571))-

-
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must be accompanied by an output reduction.340 Consider, for example, the
following appellate court's holding: "The plaintiffs submitted evidence that
[the defendant] routinely charged higher prices than other [firms] while
reaping high profits. With no accompanying showing of restricted output,
however, the plaintiffs have failed to present direct evidence of market
power."34' But a powerful firm or cartel need not reduce output to increase
profits above the competitive level. To the contrary, a powerful firm or group
of firms might increaseoutput to increase profits. For example, the defendants
in IndianaFederationof Dentistscolluded to artificially prop up demand.342 The
defendant in AmEx imposed contractual restraints that did the same.343 And
so forth. Output is not the only way to exercise market power, nor are
exercises of market power always accompanied by output reductions.
As a practical matter, the outputist definition is inefficient and likely to
force costly mistakes. To illustrate, suppose a powerful firm in a highly
concentrated market imposed contractual restraints that: (1) stifled the flow
of accurate-but-negative information about its product; and (2) externalized
the costs of its product onto others.34 Such restraints put upward pressure on
output. Yet the outputist framing of the market-power inquiry ("power to
reduce output") would force a judge to turn away from the facts at hand.s3s
Instead, it would require her to ask, "In a hypothetical world, would this firm
have the power to do something that both parties agree it did not actually do
in the real world?" This is outputism ad absurdum.
A commonly used alternative definition of market power is "the ability to
6
raise price profitably above the competitive level."34 But this suffers from
similar defects as the outputist version. First, it implicitly assumes and/or
suggests that raising price is the only way to exercise market power. But, as
noted above, firms can exercise market power in a variety of ways. In zeroprice markets-which account for an ever-increasing amount of economic
8
activity347-firms are generally unlikely to exercise power by raising prices.34
Even in positive-price markets, firms can exercise power in ways that lower,
rather than increase, prices. Suppose, for example, that a seller cartel agreed

See, e.g., Brief for Antitrust L. & Econ. Scholars as Amicus Curiae Supporting of
340.
Respondents, supra note 6, at 15 ("[P]rice effects . .. are only associated with the exercise of
market power when they are accompanied by a reduction in output.").
Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F. 3 d 1467, 1476 (gth Cir. 1997).
341.
342.

343.
344.

See supra notes 137-41 and accompanying text.
See supra Section W.A.
This example is, of course, based on the facts of AmEx. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S.

Ct. 2274, 2282-83 (2018).

See supra note 335 and accompanying text.
346. John B. Kirkwood, Market Power and Antitrust Enforcement, 98 B.U. L. REV. 116g, 1172,
1172 n.12 (2018) ("This definition is so widely used it is canonical.").
345.

347.

Newman, supra note 261, at

151.

348. John M. Newman, Antitrust in
73 (2016).

Zero-Price Markets:Applications, 94 WASH.

U. L. REV. 49,7

1
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to use a lower-cost, lower-quality input.349 Such an agreement can yield lower
market prices, while simultaneously being profitable for the sellers and
harmful to consumers.35 0 Moreover, an "increase-prices" test for market power
(wrongly) suggests that antitrust is not concerned with buyer power. It would
also necessitate a carve-out, or exception, for such cases.
The better definition asks instead whether the defendant(s) can "control"
a relevant aspect of marketplace competition. This more robust framing
allows consideration of the best evidence in a given case to inform the analysis.
It avoids the need to send litigants and judges down a metaphysical rabbithole of hypotheticals and counterfactuals. It avoids the need for exceptions
and carve-outs to address zero-price markets and buyer-power cases. And, as
noted, this definition has already been used multiple times by the Supreme

Court.35
2.

Plaintiffs Need Not Prove That Output Decreased

Insisting that antitrust plaintiffs prove one particular type of effect-an
output reduction-is bad law based on bad economics. Judges need not
evaluate conduct through such a narrow set of blinders.3s2 Nothing in the
legislative history underlying the Sherman or Clayton Acts would suggest that
this crabbed version of antitrust is appropriate.353
The AmEx case provides a ready example of the injury that can arise when
this artificial bar is imposed. Indeed, it is difficult to think of a more harmful
restraint than one that has endured for decades in a highly concentrated
market, that extracts wealth from the least well-off members of society and
redistributes it to the already-affluent, and that increases the cost of nearly

349. Seegenerally Nat'l Macaroni Mfrs. Ass'n v. FTC, 345 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1965) (agreement
to stop using ioo% durum wheat flour).
One might object that "quality-adjusted prices" have gone up, but actually identifying a
350.
"quality-adjusted price" is often next-to-impossible in the real world. See supra note 141 and
accompanying text.
See sources cited supra note 339; see also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc.,
351.
504 U.S. 451, 464 (1992) (defining market power as "the power 'to force a purchaser to do
something that he would not do in a competitive market"') (quoting Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist.

No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 14 (1984)). But see Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 235 (1993) (defining market power as the "power [to] raise . .. prices above

a competitive level"); NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109 n.38 (1984)
(defining market power as "the ability to raise prices above those that would be charged in a
competitive market").
352.

As we have seen, a number ofjudges have declined to do so. For additional examples,

see Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("Such a rigid
'price or output' rule finds little support in the case law."); O'Bannon v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n, 802 F. 3 d 1049, 1070 ( 9 th Cir. 2015) ("[A] 'reduction in output is not the only measure of
anticompetitive effect.'") (quoting IX AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, 1 150 3 b(1).

353. See, e.g., John B. Kirkwood, The Essence of Antitrust: ProtectingConsumers and Small Suppliers
from Anticompetitive Conduct, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2425, 2433-39 (2013).
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every good and service sold in the United States.354 The Output-Welfare
Fallacy was deployed to justify these harmful effects.
Without a course correction, such harms will be multiplied. Proponents
of the Fallacy describe it as extending across all of antitrust.355 Suppose it were
to be invoked in a case involving Google or Facebook, both of which operate
6
in markets that can exhibit the Push/Pull Effect.35 Regardless of the actual
merits, the Output-Welfare Fallacy would militate in favor of dismissal; at best,
it would be a waste ofjudicial resources. A myriad of other cases would present
similar problems. But the point is well-established; let us not belabor it
further. Restricting antitrust adjudication to whether the plaintiff has
demonstrated an output reduction is unjustified, unnecessary, inefficient, and
yields costly errors.
Where does that leave antitrust doctrine? Three initial points emerge:
(1) an output reduction can be a cognizable anticompetitive effect; (2) an
output increase can also be a cognizable anticompetitive effect; and (3) it is
inappropriate to insist on proof of output effects in every case. As to the first,
suppose, for example, that a plaintiff alleges that a group of powerful
defendants entered into an output-restricting agreement to enrich themselves
at the expense of their less-powerful trading partners. This was the primary
theory in NCAA v. Board of Regents, for example.357 In such a case, it makes
8
obvious sense to require proof of an output reduction.35 That was the
plaintiffs' own theory of harm.
But in other cases, plaintiffs' allegations do not center on reduced
output.359 Here, plaintiffs' initial burden should not include proving an
output reduction. Instead, adjudicators should focus at this stage on whether
the plaintiffs have adequately proven their actual theory of harm. To borrow
a phrase from the Supreme Court, "[w]hat is required ... is an enquiry meet
for the case."36 o Where the theory of harm centers some effect other than
output, that ought to be the primary focal point. Where the theory of harm
involves an output increase, that should invite analysis of whether the theory

After Australia prohibited no-steering rules like the one at issue in AmEx, retail prices
354.
nationwide declined so much that it noticeably lowered the country's overall Consumer Price
Index. See Brief for Australian Retailers Ass'n as Amicus Curiae in Supporting Petitioners, supra
note 130, at *19 ("Importantly, these benefits to consumers have often gone to those most in
need.").
356.

See supra Section I.C.
See supra Section III.B.2.

357.

Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 105-06

355.

(i 984). Even so, the Court did not focus single-mindedly on output; it discussed price effects as

well. See id. at gg-1oo.
See id. at 103 (applying the rule of reason instead of the per se illegality rule).
For an early example of a case in which output was said to be relevant but not dispositive,
359.
see Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 52 (191 i) (referring to "limitation on
production" as one of multiple types of antitrust-relevant effects).
358.

360.

Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 781 (1999).

.
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holds water, rather than a knee-jerk dismissal. For example, plaintiffs often
plausibly allege that a defendant engaged in coercion via threats or tying,
engaged in anticompetitive deception, etc.3 6 , In such cases, an output
increase can and should be cognizable as an anticompetitive effect.
To illustrate how this more flexible, robust approach can facilitate
analysis, consider NCAA v. O'Bannon. On appeal, the NCAA tried to invoke
the Output-Welfare Fallacy, arguing that the plaintiff student-athletes failed
to prove an output reduction.3 62 But the Ninth Circuit rightly rejected that
argument.3 6 3 The plaintiffs' theory of the case revolved around wage
suppression, not output effects. Because the evidence overwhelmingly
indicated that wages were negatively affected, the court held that the plaintiffs
had carried their initial burden. Forcing the student-athletes to prove an
output reduction (of what, exactly?) would have wasted their-and the
court's-time and resources. O'Bannonwas not perfect,3 64 but it is instructive
on this point.
3.

Defendants Need Not Prove an Output Increase

It would be equally misguided to require all antitrust defendants to
demonstrate an output increase in order to justify their conduct. Such a
requirement would invite harmful errors. It could, for example, lead to
condemnation of virtually all professional-association rules against false or
misleading advertising, like the one at issue in California Dental.3 65 Such rules
can prevent professionals from abusing their informational advantage and
relationship of trust to oversell services to their clients.3 66 Of course, some
professional-association rules are harmful, but many such rules benefit
consumers and society at large. The Output-Welfare Fallacy would flatly
condemn even beneficial rules, on the mistaken assumption that less output
is always bad.
For another example of the far-ranging ill effects that would arise from
analysis,
consider educationaloutputist procompetitivejustification
accreditation bodies like the American Bar Association, American Dental
Association, American Veterinary Medicine Association, and dozens more. In
antitrust litigation arising out of negative accreditation decisions, the Output361.

See supra Section I.A.

362.

O'Bannon v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 802 F. 3d 1049,

363.

Id. at 1070.

1064, 1070 ( 9 th Cir. 2015)
("First, [the NCAA] argues that because the plaintiffs never showed that the rules reduce output
in the college education market, the plaintiffs did not meet their burden of showing a significant
anticompetitive effect.").

364.
Indeed, some have criticized it for partially endorsing the defendant's argument that
the restraints were justified by their impact on viewer demand for televised college sports. See id.
at 1 o61-62; see supra note 269 and accompanying text.
365.
See generally Cal. DentalAss'n, 526 U.S. (involving the guidelines of a voluntary nonprofit
association of dental societies).

366.

Id. at 772-

73
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Welfare Fallacy would require the accreditor to prove that its actions increased
overall output of education, a difficult-and often impossible-task.3 6 7 This,
in turn, would effectively force accreditors to grant status to all applicants,
68
even rapacious sham universities.3
Or consider the various strikes launched by gig-economy workers in
spring 2020 as an effort to improve working conditions amidst the rapidly
6
spreading coronavirus pandemic.3 9 Many such workers are classified as
independent contractors, potentially exposing them to antitrust scrutiny.370
Thus, their coordinated work stoppages could be viewed as inherently suspect
horizontal output reductions.37' If an employer or ideologically motivated
enforcement agency had responded with an antitrust lawsuit, the OutputWelfare Fallacy would have forced the workers to prove that their conduct
increased output-again, a difficult, perhaps impossible, task. Outputism
would amount to an open hunting season on such workers.372 If antitrust law
can be used to force workers to undertake hazardous condition amidst a
global pandemic, surely the antitrust enterprise must stop and ask whether it
has lost its way.
In sum, the Output-Welfare Fallacy-which here would require all
defendants to demonstrate increased output-invites condemnation of a wide
variety of prosocial conduct. A different starting point is needed. Greater
output may help to indicate that the challenged conduct is justified, but lower
output can also indicate that the challenged conduct is justified. Defendants,

See supra notes 214-16 and accompanying text.
Perhaps in the long run, such standards do increase output-but how would the
368.
defendant possibly prove as much? Here, the Brooke Group Court made a valid point: "Such a
counterfactual proposition is difficult to prove in the best of circumstances ... ." Brooke Grp.
Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 233 (1993). One might also speculate
that the standards increase quality-adjusted short-run output, but that is far from clear, and the
same response applies with equal or greater force. Finally, perhaps the reader believes
accreditation standards are unjustified, but that is not the point-the question is whether an
antitrust nostrum based on fallacious reasoning should be used to overturn those standards

367.

wholesale.

369. See, e.g., Cyrus Farivar, Instacart Workers Slam Pandemic Working Conditions, Callfor Work
Stoppage, NBC NEWS (Mar. 27, 2020, 12:58 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/
instacart-workers-slam-pandemic-working-conditions-call-work-stoppage-n 1 170566 [https://perma
.cc/Y3 CP-N 4 A4] (detailing grocery store shoppers and labor activist groups protesting an online
shopping service's working conditions).
See, e.g., Marshall Steinbaum, Uber'sAntitrustProblem, AM. PROSPECT (May i1, 2016), https://
370.
prospect.org/labor/uber-s-antitrust-problem [https://perma.cc/N6HZ-3PPX] (analyzing Uber's role
in the gig economy and current antitrust litigation).
A majority of the Court characterized a similar strike as such in JTC v. Superior Ct. Trial
371.
Laws. Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 430-33 (1990) (condemning the strike as per se illegal).
Not all such coordination is subject to antitrust scrutiny. See generally, e.g., Susan
372.
Schwochau, The Labor Exemptions to Antitrust Law: An Overview, 21 J. LAB. RSCH. 535 (2ooo)
(discussing union activities that courts may not declare illegal under antitrust law). For a
somewhat analogous example, see generally Superior Ct., 493 U.S. (serving as an antitrust case
with lawyers who organized and participated in a boycott).

*
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like plaintiffs, should not be forced into the straitjacket of output-only
analysis.
It should be sufficient for a defendant to demonstrate that: (1) the
relevant market actually exhibited a cognizable source of failure;373 and (2)
the challenged conduct in fact alleviated that failure, such that any apparently
anticompetitive effects were more than offset.374 This flexibly structured
analytical framework has served antitrust well in a number of cases.375 Of
course, just as it is for plaintiffs, actual evidence is required.376
*

*

Output cannot be the "touchstone,"377 the "sine qua non,"378 or the "Holy
Grail"379 of antitrust law. Just as it is inappropriate to consider particular
aspects of conduct in isolation instead of as a whole,38o it is wrong to cabin all
of antitrust analysis to a particular type of effect. Proof of an output reduction
(or the power to reduce output) should not be required of all plaintiffs. Proof
of increased output should not be required of all defendants. Instead, courts
and enforcers should be free to consider the relevant facts at hand, using the
best evidence available.
V.

CONCLUSION

For decades, the Output-Welfare Fallacy has spread throughout antitrust
doctrine and discourse. It traces its roots to, accompanied, and facilitated the
paradigm shift toward the consumer-welfare standard. By making what might
otherwise have been a bitter pill easier to swallow, the Fallacy played a crucial

373.

119-20

See, e.g., Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85,

(1984) (rejecting the justification premised on fear that viewers would prefer televised
over in-person athletic events).
374. See, e.g., id. at 97, 117-20 (rejecting thejustification premised on "promoting athletically
balanced competition" because the challenged restraint did not actually do so). On the marketfailure framework generally used by contemporary courts, see Newman, supranote 157, at 509-13.
See Newman, supranote 157, at 522-26.
375.
376.
Despite scattered suggestions to the contrary, the overwhelming bulk of Supreme Court
precedent requires more than mere "assertions" from defendants to whom the burden has
shifted. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 485-86 (1992)
("None of Kodak's asserted business justifications . .
[we]re sufficient to prove that Kodak [wa]s
'entitled to ajudgment as a matter of law' ... .") (emphasis added); FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists,
476 U.S. 447, 462-63 (1986) (rejecting the dental association's proffered "quality of care"
justification as being factually unsupported); Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 119-20.
377.
Brief for Antitrust L. & Econ. Scholars as Amicus Curiae Supporting of Respondents,
supra note 6, at 3.

378.

Id.

379.

Crane, supra note 23, at 341.

380.

See, e.g., Cont'l Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 699 (1962)

("[I]n a case like the one before us [involving Sherman Act Section 1 and Section 2 claims], the
duty of the jury was to look at the whole picture and not merely at the individual figures in it.").
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role in facilitating the widespread embrace of Chicagoan goals and
methodologies. One cannot understand contemporary antitrust without first
grasping the importance of outputism.
At the same time, the Output-Welfare Fallacy contributed to serious
defects at the heart of the antitrust enterprise. The resulting body of doctrine
and discourse is incoherent, opaque, and prone to harming those it purports
to protect. The Fallacy threatens to render antitrust a policy at war with itself.
Moving beyond the narrowed confines of outputism allows a simpler and
more accurate-and therefore less costly and more beneficial-approach to
antitrust decision-making.
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